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NOTES
THE CORPORATE ORGANIZING
CAMPAIGN: A DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Taft-Hartley Act' was passed in 1947, labor un-
ions represented almost twenty-four percent of all United States
workers.2 In stark contrast, union members comprised only sev-
enteen percent of the work force on the Act's fiftieth anniversary
in 1987.3 Unionization of American workers has dropped six per-
cent in the 1980s alone.4
In light of these dismal statistics, unions are constantly
seeking new and innovative tactics to regain the lost member-
ship of the American work force. One such tactic is the corpo-
rate organizing campaign.5 Fundamentally different from tradi-
tional organizing tools, a corporate campaign targets an entire
company instead of focusing only on particular employees at a
particular locality. A union's organizational objective is accom-
* The author wishes to express her appreciation to Professors Thomas R. Hag-
gard and Gregory B. Adams of the University of South Carolina School of Law for their
assistance in the preparation of this Note.
1. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
2. See BUREAU oF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 412 (1980).
Thirty-four percent of nonagricultural workers were unionized in 1947.
3. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at B-1 (Jan. 25, 1988).
4. In 1980 23% of civilian workers were union members. By 1984 the percentage
of employees belonging to a labor organization was 18.8%, and by 1986 only 17.5% of
American nonagricultural workers were unionized. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at
B-6 (Feb. 23, 1987).
5. Corporate campaigns may be useful in three situations: to make a strike more
effective, to strengthen collective bargaining demands, and to organize nonunionized fa-
cilities. See C. PERRY, UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS 3 (1987). This Note focuses exclu-
sively on the corporate organizing campaign.
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plished by cutting off the company, or "target employer," from
its customers, suppliers, investors, and even the public through
coordinated activities and planning.
A corporate organizing campaign offers a less rigid format
than traditional organizing methods. Consequently, the target
employer often does not know what to expect from the union
and must deal constantly with new strategies and their unknown
results. A campaigning union will not place primary emphasis on
employee meetings and persuasion at a local level, but instead
will focus on all of the target employer's vulnerabilities and
pressure points in order to exploit them to achieve union goals.
Face-to-face organizing, while still important, is merely a com-
ponent of the larger program to force the target employer to rec-
ognize the union.,
A union considering a corporate campaign first will research
the target company to identify its vulnerabilities, especially its
sensitivity to adverse publicity.' The union likely will do a finan-
cial and economic analysis of the company, examining financial
statements and documents filed with regulatory agencies to de-
termine possible areas of sensitivity. Inquiry may be made into
the names and occupations of corporate directors and their rela-
tionships to financial institutions." In the organizing context, the
union will also evaluate the treatment of employees, prevailing
wage rates in the area, and other concrete data showing the tan-
gible benefits of unionization.'
After making this analysis, the union will develop a strategy
designed to intensify pressure on a target employer over time.10
This strategy may involve the intimidation or harassment of
business associates to induce them to cease doing business with
the target employer.'1 Isolated from its business allies, the em-
ployer may be more easily coerced into recognizing the union. 2
6. See Craft & Extejt, New Strategies in Union Organizing, 4 J. LAB. REs. 19, 21
(1983) [hereinafter Craft].
7. See C, PERRY, supra note 5, at 123.
8. See Datz, Geffner, McLaughlin & Kellock, Economic Warfare in the 1980's,
Strikes, Lockouts, Boycotts and Corporate Campaigns, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 82, 104 (1987)
[hereinafter Datz].
9. See id. at 106.
10. Id.
11. See C. PERRY, supra note 5, at 5; Craft, supra note 6, at 21-22.
12. See Craft, supra note 6, at 21-22.
[Vol. 40
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Confrontation with owners and managers is also a favorite
corporate campaign tool. "Outside" members of the board of di-
rectors may be subjected to personal or professional harassment
and embarrassment."3 Firms associated with the target employer
can be brought into the dispute, and threats of harmful public-
ity may cause them to cease dealing with the target employer or
to pressure the employer to cease opposition to organizing ef-
forts. The campaigning union also may use the annual stock-
holders' meeting to air alleged grievances and call for corrective
action.
The union may attempt to portray the target employer as a
corporate villain. For example, in at least two major corporate
campaigns, the campaigning union characterized the employer
as the nation's "number one labor law violator. ' 14 The union
also could attempt to lure government into the campaign
through legislative referenda or oversight hearings by regulatory
agencies. Such governmental involvement often gives the union
a public forum in which to air its greivances against a target
employer. 5
Other tactics include directing union investments away from
companies that resist organizing efforts. A threat to withdraw
pension funds is a common example. Indeed, one union
threatened to withdraw two billion dollars in deposits and pen-
sion funds unless the depository bank recognized the union as
its employees' bargaining agent."6 In addition, boycotts and
picketing have been used in several recent organizing campaigns.
The success of these tactics, however, apparently depends less
on their economic impact than on the adverse publicity they
generate.
17
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) has found
that the use of the corporate campaign as a union tool to achieve
bargaining goals does not violate the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).' 8 This organizational tactic, however, may not be
used with impunity; discrete elements of the corporate campaign
13. See id. at 61.
14. C. PERRY, supra note 5, at 19.
15. See id. at 51.
16. See Craft, supra note 6, at 23.
17. See id. at 23; C. PERRY, supra note 5, at 75.
18. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at A-8 (Oct. 8, 1986). The text of the
NLRA is found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (1982).
1989]
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may be unlawful under the NLRA. For example, picketing and
handbilling must comply with the NLRA's provisions. Second-
ary pressure, often prevalent in a corporate organizing cam-
paign, is also regulated by the NLRA.
Other federal and state laws may be implicated in the
course of a corporate campaign. Conspiracy with the target em-
ployer's competitors or suppliers can violate the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act or the antitrust laws. Sim-
ilarly, injuries to an employer's business or property caused by
union misconduct may subject the union to liability for compen-
satory and punitive damages. This Note will focus on these and
other issues in an attempt to assess the legal implications of the
corporate organizing campaign.
II. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT PROVISIONS
Because the NLRA governs so much union and employer
conduct in the labor relations context, a review of its statutory
provisions provides a logical starting point for evaluating the le-
gitimacy of corporate organizing campaign conduct. Recogni-
tional picketing, regulated by section 8(b)(7), can be implicated
in almost any corporate organizing campaign. Boycotts and "hot
cargo" agreements, 19 also typical campaign tools, are regulated
by sections 8(b)(4) and 8(e). Employee coercion and violence,
byproducts of a corporate campaign, are subject to regulation
under sections 7 and 8(b)(1).
Organizational activity that violates any of these provisions
allows a target employer to file unfair labor practice charges
against a campaigning union. At the very least, such charges will
divert the union's attention from its tactical battle. If the Board
finds the charges meritorious and issues a cease-and-desist or-
der, the union must re-evaluate its campaign strategy and con-
duct, perhaps causing a costly delay.
The utility of these sections to employers targeted by a cor-
porate organizing campaign is explored in detail below. Also dis-
cussed in light of possible NLRA implications is the increased
19. Under § 8(e) an employer may not agree with a union to refrain from dealing in
the products of another employer or to cease doing business with another person. Such
an agreement is known as a "hot cargo" agreement. See infra notes 145-47 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 40
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use of employer-union neutrality agreements. These agreements
often represent a possible employer vulnerability on which a
campaigning union may capitalize. Finally, some attention is
given to employer remedies under the NLRA and the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA).
A. Liability for Unlawful Conduct
Section 8(b) of the NLRA itemizes union unfair labor prac-
tices and refers to the prohibited activities of "a labor organiza-
tion or its agents. '20 The agency relationship contemplated by
this section may occur if the union in a corporate campaign en-
lists the aid of civil rights groups or religious organizations to
pressure an employer. In the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union (ACTWU) campaign against Consolidated
Foods, for example, two members of the Sisters of Divine Provi-
dence, a religious order, effectively led the campaign. The nuns
- not the union - formulated the central issues of the cam-
paign; the union merely assisted in compiling data and providing
documentary analysis.2'
The nuns denied that they were acting for the union. Al-
though this point was not litigated, such a denial would be inef-
fective to exonerate the union from any unlawful activity. Under
section 2(13) of the NLRA,22 implied or apparent authority of a
person to act may be sufficient to impose liability on a
campaigning union. Indeed, the Board may base a finding of an
agency relationship on evidence that an individual . .. "'was
acting with the knowledge and acquiescence of the Union and
that he had implied authority to do what he did.' -123
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
21. See C. PERRY, supra note 5, at 195. Cf. Butcher's Union Local 506, United Food
& Commercial Workers (Coors Distr. Co.), 268 N.L.R.B. 475 (1983) (boycott of commu-
nity festival distributing Coors beer organized by labor, religious, environmental, and
ethnic organizations).
22. Section 2(13) provides: "In determining whether any person is acting as an
'agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the
question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently
ratified shall not be controlling." 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1982).
23. NLRB v. Local 90, Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons' Int'l Ass'n, 606
F.2d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting NLRB v. Local 135, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 267
F.2d 870, 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 914 (1959)).
1989]
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B. Recognitional Picketing
One corporate campaign goal is to undermine an employer's
resistance to a labor union's organization of its employees.24 To
this end, a union may choose to engage in recognitional or orga-
nizational picketing. Interference with an employer's business
relations with suppliers and customers, as well as the economic
loss necessarily incurred because of the picketing, may induce
the employer to bargain with the campaigning union. Employ-
ees, impressed by the union's seeming control over the em-
ployer's business, also may look more favorably upon the pros-
pects of union membership.25
Yet the use of recognitional picketing as an economic
weapon in a corporate organizing campaign is not without limi-
tation. The employer may invoke section 8(b)(7) (C) 6 to protect
its business and employees from the protracted organizational
picketing that may accompany a corporate campaign. This sec-
tion prohibits recognitional or organizational picketing by an un-
certified union unless an election petition is filed within a rea-
sonable period of time - not more than thirty days after the
commencement of the picketing. Failure to file a petition makes
24. See C. PERRY, supra note 5, at 3.
25. See R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 220 (1976).
26. Section 8(b)(7)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to picket an
employer that lawfully has recognized another labor organization. Section 8(b)(7)(B)
stipulates that picketing an employer when a valid election has been conducted within
the preceding 12 months is a violation of the Act. Subsection (C), however, is most likely
to be violated by a union in the corporate organizing campaign situation. Section
8(b)(7)(C) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents...
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be pick-
eted, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees ...
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under sec-
tion (9(c)] being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty
days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided. . . [t]hat nothing
in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other
publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consum-
ers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a
labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individ-
ual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick
up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services. . ..
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1982) (emphasis in original).
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss2/6
CORPORATE ORGANIZING CAMPAIGN
continuation of the picketing an unfair labor practice."
1. Picketing Defined
Although the NLRA contains no definition of "picket," this
term generally means a group of persons moving in front of an
employer's premises carrying placards that communicate a
union's claims.28 The Board and the courts, however, have con-
strued the word broadly in finding violations of section
8(b)(7)(C).
"The important feature of picketing appears to be the post-
ing by a labor organization ... at the approach to a place of
business to accomplish a purpose which advances the cause of
the union, such as keeping employees away from work or keep-
ing customers away from the employer's business. '29 A coercive
object - a "signal" effect"0 - may be found when union activi-
ties induce action by employees or third persons. Physical action
is not a necessary ingredient of picketing; 31 the placement of
signs in a snowbank32 or on poles or trees33 constitutes picketing
if union members observe the signs from a nearby vantage point.
Further, courts may view handbills distributed after actual pa-
trolling is discontinued as a continuation of picketing if they
constitute a signal to employees to take action usually evoked by
27. See Kobell v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 23, 788
F.2d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 1986); International Hod Carriers, Local 840 (C.A. Blinne Constr.
Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1167 (1962).
28. See R. GORMAN, supra note 25, at 223; see also NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers & Warehousemen Local 760 , 377 U.S. 58, 77 (1964) (Tree Fruits) (Black, J.,
concurring) (patrolling encompasses "standing or marching back and forth or round and
round ... generally adjacent to someone else's premises").
29. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797 (Stoltze Land & Lumber
Co.), 156 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1965). Cf. San Diego Typographical Union No. 221 (Central
Graphics), 264 N.L.R.B. 874, 874 n.1 (1982) (handbilling that accompanies traditional
picketing constitutes picketing).
30. Teamsters Local 688 (Levitz Furniture Co. of Missouri, Inc.), 205 N.L.R.B.
1131, 1133 (1973).
31. See NLRB v. Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir.
1963); Lawrence Typographical Union No. 570 (Kansas Color Press. Inc.), 169 N.L.R.B.
279, 283, enforced, 402 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1968).
32. See, e.g., Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Woodward Motors, Inc.), 135
N.L.R.B. 851 (1962), enforced, 314 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1963).
33. See, e.g., United Furniture Workers (Jamestown Sterling Corp.), 146 N.L.R.B.
474, remanded, 337 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964).
1989]
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traditional picket lines.34 The Board also has found that the pro-
hibition against picketing in section 8(b)(7)(C) encompasses
mere threats to picket a target employer, even if actual picket-
ing never occurs.3
2. Object of Picketing
If recognition of the union is "an" object of picketing, the
union must comply with section 8(b)(7)(C).36 In an attempt to
avoid the limitations of that section, the union may represent
the objectives of its picketing as something other than recogni-
tion or organization. 37 The Board, of course, may find a recogni-
tional object in picket signs or requests directed to a target's em-
ployees to join the union. s In the corporate campaign context,
union objectives may not be so clear-cut, but union literature
and press releases may evince a recognitional objective.
34. See Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 477 F.2d 1104, 1108 (6th Cir. 1973) (handbilling that
contained substantially the same message as picket placards and was conducted in the
same area as the picketing was tantamount to picketing); see also Hoffman v. Cement
Masons Union Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1972) (handbill that continued
union's message and to which readers were referred by picket sign constituted picketing),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); but see Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (General
Contractors Ass'n), 262 N.L.R.B. 528 (1982) (handbilling not picketing when no signal
intended); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B.
901, 905 (1961) (handbilling does not constitute picketing under § 8(b)(4)).
35. In General Servs. Employees Union Local No. 73 (A-1 Security Serv. Co.), 224
N.L.R.B. 434, 436 (1976), enforced, 578 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the Board recognized
that the legislative history of § 8(b)(7)(C), even though it does not expressly address the
question whether a threat to picket is within the section's proscriptions, clearly evinces a
congressional intent to prohibit both threats to picket and actual picketing. See also
Wackenhut Corp. Gen. Serv. Employees Union Local 73, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 127
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1217 (Dec. 16, 1987); Highway Drivers, Local 710 (University of Chi-
cago), 274 N.L.R.B. 956 (1985); Local Union No. 803, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (St.
Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Center), 274 N.L.R.B. 905 (1985); Local 32E, Serv. Employees
Int'l Union (Cadillac Fairview Shopping Centers, Ltd.), 259 N.L.R.B. 771 (1981).
36. See Local 345, Retail Store Employees (Gem of Syracuse, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B.
1168 (1964). Whether or not an object of picketing is for recognition or organization is a
question of fact. See Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Woodward Motors, Inc.), 135
N.L.RB. 851 (1962), enforced, 314 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1963).
37. For example, a union may clothe its picketing as a protest against the em-
ployer's acts or policies. See Waiters & Bartenders Local 500 (Mission Valley Inn), 140
N.L.R.B. 433 (1963) (commission of unfair labor practice); Houston Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council (Claude Everett Constr. Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962) (area standards
protests).
38. See Local 345, Retail Store Employees (Gem of Syracuse, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B.
1168 (1964); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 635 (Mays, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1091 (1964).
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The Board will look at a union's overall conduct to ascertain
the object of its picketing."9 If, however, an employer can prove
that the union's activities include even one recognitional object,
the foundation is laid for a section 8(b)(7)(C) unfair labor prac-
tice charge.40
3. Time Within Which a Union May Picket
Section 8(b)(7)(C) does not define the "reasonable period of
time" during which a union may conduct its recognitional pick-
eting without filing an election petition; indeed, the section im-
poses only an outside limitation of thirty days. This determina-
tion is made by the Board on a case-by-case basis,"' but after
the reasonable time has elapsed, the union's picketing may be
enjoined under section 10(1)4 even if a petition is subsequently
filed within thirty days.
43
Union misconduct often shortens the normal thirty-day pe-
riod. For example, picketing accompanied by violence and intim-
idation has been enjoined after ten days.1" Twenty-six days of
picketing was found to be unreasonable when a union's miscon-
duct, including threats and violence, prevented a free election.4 5
Physical assaults, as well as rock throwing and threats of bodily
injury, also have shortened the thirty-day period. 46
Unfortunately, a corporate campaign frequently encom-
passes violence and inflammatory actions on the picket line.
Based on these decisions, a target employer faced with such mis-
conduct may succeed in shortening the time within which the
39. See Theatre & Amusement Janitors Local 9 (United Artists Communications,
Inc.), 272 N.L.R.B. 685 (1984); Automotive Employees Union Local No. 618 (Congress of
Indep. Unions), 193 N.L.R.B. 714 (1971).
40. See IATSE, Local 15 (Albatross Prods., Inc.), 275 N.L.R.B. 744 (1985).
41. See District 65, Retail Store Union (Eastern Camera & Photo Corp.), 141
N.L.R.B. 991, 999 (1963).
42. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
43. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1096 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
LABOR LAW].
44. See Cuneo v. United Shoe Workers, 181 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1960).
45. 141 N.L.R.B. at 999.
46. See Local 443, Teamsters (Leon's Inc.), NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem., 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1341, 1343 (Jan. 12, 1984). But see International Ass'n of Bridge Work-
ers, Local 782 (Fogel-Anderson Constr. Co.), NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem., 113 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1084 (May 5, 1983) (threats of violence not accompanied by any threat to picket
are insufficient to shorten the 30-day reasonable time period under § 8(b)(7)(C)).
19891
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union may picket, thereby limiting employees' exposure to cam-
paign propaganda.
4 7
4. Publicity Proviso
Section 8(b)(7)(C) is subject to a publicity proviso that pro-
tects truthful informational picketing.48 A union that pickets an
employer for more than thirty days without filing a petition will
not violate section 8(b)(7)(C) if the union can meet the criteria
set forth in the proviso. Indeed, if the picketing satisfies the pro-
viso requirements, it may continue indefinitely.
49
To come within the proviso, a union first must show that its
picketing is for the purpose of truthfully advising the public that
the target employer has no union contract. The proviso protects
picketing that is directed only to the public;50 it affords no pro-
tection to picketing designed to appeal to other labor groups to
exert economic pressure on an employer. Consequently, a union
petitioning for recognition by a contractor may not enlist
through picketing the support of a union representing a subcon-
tractor.8 1 Further, picketing directed to employees of the target
employer or a secondary employer is clearly unprotected by the
proviso.2 As long as signs or handbills "'embod[y] in substance
the language of the publicity proviso,' ,,53 the picketing is pro-
47. In the corporate campaigns against Hormel and Phelps Dodge, numerous inci-
dents of violence were reported, resulting in the employers or the state attorney general
calling in the National Guard. See C. PERRY, supra note 5, at 40.
48. See supra note 26.
49. See generally Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Lo-
cal 681 (Irwin), 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds sub
nom. Smitley v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1964).
50. See Carpenters Local Union No. 2361 (Adams Insulation Co.), 248 N.L.R.B.
313, 314-15 (1980), enforced without opinion, 652 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1981). For examples
of language that falls within and without the proviso, see United Food & Commercial
Workers, Local 23 (Duncan Manor Foodland), NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem., 120 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1345 (Sept. 25, 1985).
51. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 530 F.2d 298, 804 (3d
Cir. 1976) (signs that directed Teamsters to honor picket line found not within the pro-
viso); see also Baldovin v. IATSE, Local 279, 570 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
52. See, e.g., General Serv. Employees, Local 73 (Active Detective Agency), 240
N.L.R.B. 462 (1979); see generally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN
THE PRIVATE SEcTOR 235, § 8.06(c)(3)(B) (2d ed. 1986).
53. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 23 (Duncan Manor Foodland),
NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1345, 1346 (Sept. 25, 1985) (quoting
Retail Clerks, Local 1404 (Jay Jacobs Downtown, Inc.), 140 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1346 (1963))
[Vol. 40
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tected. If the signs do not convey that the employer does not
employ members of or have a contract with the union, the mes-
sage falls outside the protective scope of the proviso.
54
Even though picketing is directed to the public, it still may
be unlawful if it has the effect of inducing a work stoppage or
interfering with pickups and deliveries.5 Such effect will not be
found, however, unless the picketing has "disrupted, interfered
with, or curtailed the employer's business"1;51 an isolated inter-
ruption or work stoppage is insufficient to withdraw proviso pro-
tection.5" A substantial secondary effect - for instance, a third
party's refusal to deliver goods - will be found unlawful under
the proviso. A primary effect - as when employees cease work-
ing because of the picketing - is generally lawful. 8
C. Violation of Section 7 Rights (Coercion)
Notwithstanding the sophisticated tactics sometimes used
in a corporate organizing campaign, individuals necessarily com-
prise a crucial component of that organizational effort. Those in-
dividuals, whether employees of a target employer or strangers
to the dispute, are protected by section 8(b)(1)(A) 59 of the
(brackets in original) (footnote omitted).
54. See, e.g., Local 275, Laborers Int'l (S.B. Apts., Inc.), 209 N.L.R.B. 279, 280
(1974) (area standards language alone not within the scope of the proviso).
55. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 211 (Atlantic County Improve-
ment Auth.), 248 N.L.R.B. 168, 172 (1980); Local 217, Hotel & Restaurant Employees
(Picadilly Square, Ltd.), 223 N.L.R.B. 1058, 1063-64 (1976).
56. Retail Clerks Local 324 (Barker Bros. Corp. & Gold's, Inc.), 138 N.L.R.B. 478,
491 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 328 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1964).
57. Compare Retail Clerks, id. (Board found picketing lawful even though three
drivers refused to make deliveries during twelve-week period and other deliveries
delayed) with San Diego County Waiters & Bartenders Local 1500 (Hunt's), 138
N.L.R.B. 470 (1962) (driver employed by distributor refused to cross picket line at res-
taurant that was target of organizational campaign). See also San Francisco Local Joint
Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Building &
Constr. Trades Council (Strescon Indus., Inc.), 222 N.L.R.B. 1276, enforced without
opinion, 530 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1976).
58. See F. BARTOSIc & R. HARTLEY, supra note 52, § 8.06(c)(3)(B), at 236; see also
NLRB v. Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 289 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
833 (1961).
59. Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
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NLRA, which labels union coercion or restraint of employees in
the exercise of their section 7 rights as an unfair labor practice.
The United States Supreme Court has found that section
8(b)(1)(A) is a limited grant to the Board "to proceed against
union tactics involving violence, intimidation, and reprisal or
threats."6 0 When a union uses these tactics to coerce or restrain
persons in their search for or support of a union-free workplace,
an unfair labor practice charge, filed by an employer or em-
ployee, likely will be successful.6
1. Coercion of Employees
When picketing or strike activity is an element of a corpo-
rate organizing campaign, violence is likely to occur. In fact, vio-
lence already has surfaced in several corporate campaigns. Strik-
ers of Louisiana-Pacific Corp. allegedly struck with baseball bats
and rocks a van carrying replacement workers.6 2 In both the
Phelps Dodge strike with the Steelworkers and the Hormel-
UFCW strike, threats of picketing and violence led to police and
national guard protection at the struck facilities.
6 3
Fortunately for the employer, the Board is quick to find a
section 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice when a union restrains
or coerces employees by violent means from exercising their sec-
tion 7 rights. For example, an attack by picketers against an em-
ployee who desires to cross a picket line is impermissible.4
teed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982) (emphasis added).
Section 7 provides, in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
60. NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960).
61. Similarly, employers who engage in violence in an effort to prevent unionization
may be charged with an 8(a)(1) violation. See NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360,
1365 (7th Cir. 1983).
62. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at A-6 (July 29, 1983).
63. See C. PERRY, supra note 5, at 40, 124; Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at A-1
(Jan. 23, 1984).
64. See Congreso de Uniones Industriales (Rosario), 279 N.L.R.B. 626 (1986); see
[Vol. 40
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Damaging employee property also is prohibited.65 Even nonvio-
lent physical activity may constitute coercion and restraint of
employees' section 7 rights; mere threats of violence, such as
those directed at an employee who attempts to cross a picket
line, may violate section 8(b)(1)(A). ee
Mass picketing that prevents employees from gaining en-
trance to an employer's premises,67 as well as name-calling or
obscene gesturing, 8 may violate the NLRA. Further, the union
may be held responsible for picket line violence despite its in-
structions to picket peacefully."
2. Coercion of Nonemployees
Section 8(b)(1)(A) expressly prohibits only restraint and co-
ercion of "employees.""0 The Board will find a violation of this
section, however, when union representatives commit or
also Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 87 (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.), 279 N.L.R.B. 168
(1986) (picket struck employee with sign); Teamsters Local 115 (Gross Metal Prods.,
Inc.), 275 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1985) (employees shoved, punched, and threatened by union
representatives), enforced, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); cf. Produce Employees, Ill. Lo-
cal 703 (Kennicott Bros.), 284 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1033 (July 20,
1987) (union representatives' assaults of members were basis for setting election aside).
65. See District 30 United Mine Workers v. NLRB, 819 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1987).
For an excellent treatise on union violence, see A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, UNION VIO-
LENCE: THE RECORD AND THE RESPONSE BY COURTS, LEGISLATURES. AND THE NLRB (1983).
Chapter eleven considers violence in the § 8(b)(1)(A) context. See also Haggard, Labor
Union Violence as an Unfair Labor Practice, 34 S.C.L. REv. 273 (1982).
66. See Redway Carriers, Inc. (Fraternal Ass'n of Special Haulers), 274 N.L.R.B.
1359 (1985) (employees threatened with bodily harm; rocks thrown at vehicles driven by
nonstriking employees); Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen, Local No. 543 (North Am. Car
Corp.), 248 N.L.R.B. 285 (1980) (employees and supervisors threatened).
67. See Cullum Mechanical Constr., Inc. (Wokasch), 281 N.L.R.B. 453 (1986) (mass
picketing at site to intimidate employees); Nassau Ins. Co. (Local 917, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters), 280 N.L.R.B. 878 (1986) (blocking ingress and egress from plant); Team-
sters, 275 N.L.R.B. 1547; Railway Carmen, 248 N.L.R.B. 285. Mass picketing has been
employed in the corporate campaign context on at least one occasion. See generally
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at A-13 (Jan. 22, 1986).
68. See, e.g., Construction, Prod. & Maintenance Laborers' Local 383 (Carter-Glo-
gau Laboratories, Inc.), 260 N.L.R.B. 1340 (1982) .
69. See District 30 United Mine Workers v. NLRB, 819 F.2d 651, 655-56 (6th Cir.
1987); Local Lodge 758, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists (Menasco, Inc.), 267 N.L.R.B. 1147
(1983); cf. United Tel. Answering & Communications Serv. Union, Local 780 (Federated
Communications Serv., Inc.), 276 N.L.R.B. 507 (1985). But see International Union,
United Mine Workers (Fletcher Mining Co.), 271 N.L.R.B. 20 (1984) (mass picketing and
violence did not violate § 8(b)(1)(A) even though union president present at picket line).
70. See supra note 59.
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threaten violence in the presence of nonemployees or when em-
ployees are likely to hear about such conduct.71 Violence actually
directed at nonemployees, such as supervisors or company offi-
cials, also has been found to violate the NLRA72
3. Union Rules
A union generally is free to discipline a member by internal
rules without violating the NLRA.7 3 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, carved an exception in Scofield v. NLRB:74 "[I]f the
[union] rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the la-
bor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion,
without violating [section] 8(b) (1) (A)."7 5 Under this rationale,
disciplining employees for refusal to engage in unlawful or un-
protected activity (such as an unlawful secondary boycott in
connection with a corporate campaign) violates section
8(b)(1)(A).78
71. See District 65, Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union (B. Brown Assocs.), 157
N.L.R.B. 615 (1966), enforced, 375 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Railway Carmen,
248 N.L.R.B. 285.
72. See Teamsters Local 115 (Oakwood Chair Mfg. Co.), 277 N.L.R.B. 694 (1985)
(threats to and assaults of supervisors); Teamsters Local 115 (Gross Metal Prods., Inc.),
275 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1985) (company officials slapped, spat upon, held captive by mass
pickets), enforced, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n
(Trailer Marine Transp. Corp.), 266 N.L.R.B. 1204 (1983) (threat of reprisals to trucking
company driver if he tried to cross picket line), enforced without opinion, 738 F.2d 423
(3d Cir. 1984). But see Plateau Coal Sales, Inc. (District 29, United Mine Workers), 279
N.L.R.B. 1151 (1986) (scuffle with co-owner no violation).
73. See supra note 59.
74. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
75. Id. at 429. The Court held that it would sustain union discipline that "left the
collective bargaining process unimpaired, breached no collective contract, required no
pay for unperformed services, induced no discrimination by the employer against any
class of employees, and represent[ed] no dereliction by the union of its duty of fair rep-
resentation." Id. at 436. See also International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
(Adrian Penner), 223 N.L.R.B. 959 (1976); cf. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473
U.S. 95 (1985).
76. See NLRB v. Stationary Eng'rs, Local 39, 746 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984); District
Council of Painters (J.A. Stewart Constr. Co.), 278 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1986); United Ass'n of
Journeymen (T.S. Hanson Plumbing), 277 N.L.R.B. 1231 (1985), petition for enforce-
ment granted, 827 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1987); United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
Local 1439 (Rosauer's Supermarkets, Inc.), 275 N.L.R.B. 30 (1985); Hospital & Institu-
tional Workers Union, Local 250 (Associated Hosps.), 254 N.L.R.B. 834 (1981). See also
2 LABOR LAW supra note 43, at 171; R. GORMAN, supra note 25, at 682.
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D. Secondary Pressure
Secondary pressure is an integral part of an effective corpo-
rate campaign. Through picketing, handbilling, and similar pub-
licity, a union can induce a person with whom it has no dispute,
a secondary person, to cease doing business with the person with
whom it does have a dispute - namely, a target employer. For
example, in the J.P. Stevens campaign, ACTWU succeeded in
causing New York Life Insurance Company to oust its Stevens
board member and to pressure Stevens to deal with the union.
Similarly, unions threatened to withdraw their assets from trust
funds managed by Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. because a
Stevens director sat on the Manufacturers Hanover board."7
Secondary pressure by unions is regulated by section
8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA, which provides in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion or its agents-
(4)(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged
in commerce .... where ... an object thereof is
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using ... or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,. . . or
to cease doing business with any other person .... 78
A careful reading of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is critically impor-
tant in understanding its application to secondary pressure.
First, the union's activity is prohibited only when directed at a
neutral person;79 a person allied with the primary employer is
not entitled to the protection of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The activ-
ity also must be threatening, coercive, or restraining. If it is, the
activity is prohibited under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if its object is
intentionally to cause the neutral person to cease or refrain from
doing business with the primary target. One caveat exists: if con-
duct falls within the proviso to section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), a union
may exert economic pressure on a secondary person with
77. See Craft, supra note 6, at 22.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982).
79. A "person" under the NLRA "includes one or more individuals, labor organiza-
tions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, . . or re-
ceivers." Id. § 152(1).
1989] 463
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impunity.80
1. Separate and Allied Employers
A union engaged in a corporate organizing campaign may
exert pressure on a target employer by boycotting the em-
ployer's subsidiary or division. For example, a campaign aimed
at General Motors or Ford may direct its efforts toward local
automobile dealers. Similarly, boycotting a company whose of-
ficer or director is also an officer or director of the target em-
ployer is not uncommon in a corporate campaign.
In determining the legality of such activity, the first ques-
tion to ask is whether the secondary employer, in light of its
relationship with the primary employer, is entitled to the protec-
tion of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). If the secondary employer is "al-
lied" with the target employer, it is not neutral and must endure
any union pressure.81 If, however, the secondary employer is
found to be a separate employer under the NLRA, it will be en-
titled to the protection given to neutral persons under section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
The Board and the courts look to several factors to deter-
mine whether union activity involves separate employers or al-
lies. The ally doctrine generally is applied when the employer is
either a "struck work" ally - it performs work that it would not
have performed except for the strike - or engages in a
"straight-line" operation through its identification with the pri-
mary employer. As the Board noted in its Curtin Matheson
2
decision, however, the "question of neutrality [] 'cannot be an-
swered by the application of a set of verbal formulae.' "83 Conse-
quently, determining whether an employer is in fact neutral will
depend on the extent of the mutual interest between the two
entities, regardless of the nature of that interest. Lack of com-
mon ownership, management, and financial control are signifi-
80. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
81. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 52, § 8.07(e), at 249; see also News-
paper & Mail Deliverers' Union (Gannett Co.), 271 N.L.R.B. 60, 67 (1984).
82. Teamsters Local 560 (Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.), 248 N.L.R.B. 1212
(1980).
83. Id. at 1214 (quoting Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446,
451 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971)). See also 2 LABOR LAW, supra note
43, at 1165.66.
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cant indications that the two entities are single employers.8 4 The
interrelationship of business operations, which includes in-
terchanges of employees or equipment, common insurance or
pension funds, and mutual advertising, also is weighed.
85
The degree of labor relations centralization, however, ap-
pears to be the most important factor in this analysis.88 For ex-
ample, in Local 456 Teamsters (Carvel Corp.)87 the Board fo-
cused upon this criterion to the exclusion of all other factors
that indicated ally status. Here, a union whose primary dispute
was with the franchisor picketed a franchisee. In evaluating the
union's claim that the two were allies, the Board disregarded the
significant integration of operations between the franchisor and
franchisee. Similarly, it found unpersuasive the franchisee's de-
pendency on the franchisor for substantially all of the products
sold in its stores88 and essentially ignored its own finding that
the franchisee's economic survival depended on the franchisor.
The Board focused instead on the independence of labor rela-
tions policies between the franchisor and the franchisee.89 Be-
cause the franchisee could hire, fire, and set terms and condi-
tions of employment free from approval or interference by the
franchisor, the Board found that the franchisee was a neutral
third party entitled to the NLRA's protection. 0
A franchise relationship symbolizes an almost total interre-
lationship between two entities. The Board's Carvel opinion,
however, indicates that this interrelationship is not controlling;
indeed, it is almost irrelevant. This finding may be of limited
comfort to the beleaguered secondary employer because Carvel
involved unique considerations relevant to the status of neutral-
ity and may be fact-specific.9 1 Nonetheless, the case signifies the
importance attached to labor relations independence and the
84. See Gannett Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 60; United Food & Commercial Workers, Local
1059 (Albrecht's Ohio Inns, Inc.), 268 N.L.R.B. 595 (1984).
85. See Gannett Co., 271 N.L.R.B. at 68; Albrecht's, 268 N.L.R.B. at 598-99.
86. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 456 (Carvel Corp.), 273 N.L.R.B. 516, 520 (1984).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 519.
89. See id. at 519-20.
90. See id. at 520.
91. See Bennett v. Local 456, Teamsters & Chauffeurs Union, 459 F. Supp. 223,
229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (enumerating the difficulty of determining the franchisee's neu-
tral status).
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latitude given by the Board when that independence is found."2
2. Proscribed Conduct
The union in the Louisiana-Pacific corporate campaign
threatened retailers with boycotts if they continued to stock
Louisiana-Pacific products.93 This type of union conduct triggers
the part of the section 8(b)(4)(ii) analysis that focuses upon "the
coercive nature of the [union] conduct, whether it be picketing
or otherwise."94
The Supreme Court most recently considered the coercion
question in deciding whether section 8(b)(4)(ii) prohibited the
distribution of handbills advocating a complete boycott of a sec-
ondary retailer. In Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council95 the Court
found no "clear indication in the relevant legislative history that
Congress intended [section] 8(b)(4)(ii) to proscribe peaceful
handbilling, unaccompanied by picketing, urging a consumer
boycott of a neutral employer."9' 6 The majority noted that
whether secondary activity is coercive is not tied solely to the
issue of economic loss by the neutral:97 "The loss of customers
because they read a handbill urging them not to patronize a bus-
iness, and not because they are intimidated by a line of picket-
ers, is the result of mere persuasion, and the neutral who reacts
is doing no more than what its customers honestly want it to
do.,,os
92. For a similar case, see Quick Shop Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 446
F. Supp. 733, 739 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1979).
93. See Fletcher, The Corporate Campaign - Labor's Ultimate Weapon or Sui-
cide Bomb?, 65 N.C.L. REv. 85, 88 (1986).
94. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S. 58,
68 (1964) (Tree Fruits). See United Scenic Artists, Local 829 v. NLRB, 762 F.2d 1027,
1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Board may make an unlawful secondary boycott determination
only if it finds that the union intended to coerce a neutral employer); Local Union No.
501, IEW v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 888, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Board must establish that union
conduct reveals intent to involve neutrals in labor disputes to establish secondary boy-
cott violation); Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634, 639 (6th Cir. 1980) (statute "is con-
cerned with the purpose of the picketing, not with its actual effect").
95. 108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988).
96. Id. at 1402.
97. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 72.
98. 108 S. Ct. at 1400.
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3. Proscribed Objects
Even if union activity against a neutral employer is coercive,
that coercion is prohibited only when it has an "object" of forc-
ing a person to cease or refrain from doing business with any
other person.99
The United States Supreme Court has found picketing that
only persuades a customer not to buy a struck product and that
is closely confined to the primary dispute does not have an un-
lawful object. In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760
(Tree Fruits)00 the Court found that "struck product" picket-
ing, which is directed at customers to encourage them not to
purchase the primary employer's product, was not prohibited by
the NLRA.10° The Court distinguished peaceful consumer pick-
eting designed to persuade customers of the secondary employer
to cease all trading with the employer from struck product
peaceful picketing of the secondary employer:
In the latter case, the union's appeal to the public is confined
to its dispute with the primary employer, since the public is
not asked to withhold its patronage from the secondary em-
ployer, but only to boycott the primary employer's goods. On
the other hand, a union appeal to the public at the secondary
site not to trade at all with the secondary employer goes be-
yond the goods of the primary employer, and seeks the public's
assistance in forcing the secondary employer to cooperate with
the union in its primary dispute.102
Thus, picketing that "merely follow[s] the struck product" and
99. See Boxhorn's Big Muskego Gun Club, Inc. v. Electrical Workers Local 494,
620 F. Supp. 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1985), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded in part, 798
F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1986); Allentown Racquetball & Health Club, Inc. v. Building & Con-
str. Trades Council, 525 F. Supp. 156, 161 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (prohibited appeal is one that
encourages consumers to boycott the neutral employer completely rather than just the
product of the primary employer); Teamsters Local 456 (Carvel Corp.), 273 N.L.R.B. 516
(1984).
100. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
101. Picketing directed not to customers of the employer, but to its employees, is
prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(ii). See Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 477 F.2d 1104, 1107 (6th Cir. 1973);
American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 154-55 (6th Cir. 1969). Further, "where the
union chooses to engage in secondary picketing, the union must accept the burden of
properly identifying the struck products." NLRB v. San Francisco Typographical Union
No. 21, 465 F.2d 53, 56 (9th Cir. 1972).
102. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63-64 (footnote omitted).
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does not "create[] a separate dispute with the secondary em-
ployer ' 10 3 does not fall within the proscriptions of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
After Tree Fruits the Board and the lower courts consist-
ently held that a struck product boycott was prohibited when
the product comprised an integral part of the secondary com-
pany's business.10 4 Sixteen years after Tree Fruits, the Supreme
Court itself agreed that this type of "total" secondary boycott
was unlawful. In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local
1001 (Safeco)"°5 the Court found that a union's picketing of title
companies to induce customers to cancel their Safeco insurance
policies was "'reasonably calculated to induce customers not to
patronize the neutral parties at all,' "106 and, thus, was "dis-
tinctly different"10 7 from the Tree Fruits scenario.
In Tree Fruits the picketed product was only one of many
produced by the retailer. Conversely, in Safeco the title compa-
nies sold only Safeco's product. Therefore, "[s]econdary picket-
ing against consumption of the primary product leaves respon-
sive consumers no realistic option other than to boycott the title
companies altogether. If the appeal succeeds, each company
'stops buying the struck product . . . in response to pressure
designed to inflict injury on [its] business generally.' "108
Under this rationale, injury to neutral employers from sec-
ondary picketing that only discourages purchase of a struck
product is a "natural consequence" 00 of primary activity. For
example, a union engaged in a corporate campaign against a
meat-packing company may picket a supermarket with signs
that ask customers, "Please Don't Buy X Sausage Here." l0 On
the other hand, when the union advocates boycotting the sec-
ondary company's only product or when a product boycott in
103. Id. at 72 (footnote omitted).
104. See, e.g., Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952, 955
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Teamsters Local 327 (American Bread Co.), 170 N.L.R.B. 91 (1968),
enforced, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969).
105. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
106. Id. at 610 (quoting Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Land Title Ins.
Co.), 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 757 (1976)).
107. Id. at 614.
108. Id. at 613 (quoting NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58,
72 (1964) (Tree Fruits)) (brackets in original).
109. 447 U.S. at 614.
110. See Fletcher, supra note 93, at 98.
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which a primary employer's product is so merged into the sec-
ondary company's total offering to the public that the primary's
product is not clearly identifiable, 1 ' section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is trig-
gered and the union may be found guilty of unlawful conduct.
Thus, if a local Ford dealership is not an ally of Ford Motor
Company, a union engaged in a corporate campaign with Ford
could not picket the local dealership with signs urging consum-
ers not to buy Ford products.
4. The Publicity Proviso
The prohibition in section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) against threaten-
ing, coercing, or restraining any person is subject to a proviso
allowing unions to exert some forms of economic pressure even if
that pressure constitutes a secondary boycott."L2 Under the pro-
viso, a union's boycott of a neutral company through truthful
publicity - for example, handbilling, letters, or advertisements
- is lawful unless it results in a refusal to deliver or pick up
goods at the secondary site."1
3
111. In Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1980), the court noted a "well-
established exception to the Tree Fruits exception to § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)," id. at 637, which
exists for products
so merged with the secondary employer's total offering to the public that for
all practical purposes, a boycott of the struck product is not separable from a
boycott of the secondary employer. . . .In both cases, a successful boycott of
the struck product entails a boycott of substantially all of the secondary em-
ployer's business, thereby forcing it to choose between survival and severance
of ties with the primary employer.
Id. See also Solien v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 623 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Allen-
town Racquetball & Health Club, Inc. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 525 F.
Supp. 156 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Teamsters Local 327 (American Bread Co.), 170 N.L.R.B. 91
(1968), enforced, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969).
112. The publicity proviso of § 8(b)(4) provides in pertinent part:
[T]hat for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in
such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing,
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public. . . that a product or prod-
ucts are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a pri-
mary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such public-
ity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person
other than the primary employer. . . to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport
any goods, or not to perform any services . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982).
113. See R. GORMAN, supra note 25, at 261.
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a. Publicity Content
The proviso protects only truthful information directed to
the public.1 " Further, the union's publicity may only: (1) advise
the public of the nature of its dispute with the primary em-
ployer; (2) detail the secondary employer's relationship to the
primary employer; and (3) ask for a permissible boycott of the
employer." 5 Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit held in Hospital &
Service Employees Local 399 v. NLRB,'" the publicity may not
include additional information, such as accident or consumer
complaint information, which is totally unrelated to the primary
dispute." 7 Consequently, a campaigning union cannot use the
proviso as a safe harbor when it generates broad adverse public-
ity about a target employer.
b. Producer/Distributor Requirement
The protection afforded by the proviso is further limited to
publicity advising the public that a product "produced by an
employer" is being "distributed by" another employer." 8 The
Supreme Court has given a broad interpretation to the term
"producer." In NLRB v. Servette, Inc.1" 9 the Court found that a
wholesale distributor that did not physically produce any prod-
ucts was a "producer" within the terms of the proviso. At least
one court interpreted Servette to hold that an advertiser of
products manufactured by another is a "producer" within the
proviso. 120 Under this analysis, a union that otherwise conforms
114. See Boxhorn's Big Muskego Gun Club, Inc. v. Electrical Workers Local 494,
798 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1986); F. BARTOSIC & R HARTLEY, supra note 52, § 8.07(g), at
256; accord Allentown Racquetball & Health Club, Inc. v. Building & Constr. Trades
Council, 525 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (court justified requiring less than total accu-
racy in a publication by holding that a newspaper ad concerning a primary dispute was
protected by the publicity proviso as long as there was a reasonable belief at the time of
publication that the information was true).
115. See Solien v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 623 F. Supp. 597, 604 (E.D. Mo. 1985);
see also Hospital & Serv. Employees Union, Local 399 (Delta Air Lines, Inc.), 263
N.L.R.B. 996 (1982), enforced in part and remanded, 743 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1984).
116. 743 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1984).
117. See id. at 1422.
118. See supra note 112; see also Boxhorn's, 798 F.2d at 1019.
119. 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
120. See Great W. Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 384 U.S. 1002 (1966).
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to the proviso's limitations may, for example, advocate a total
boycott of companies advertising on a struck television or radio
station. 2'
Although the Court affords an expansive definition to the
term "producer," it has limited the proviso's reach to publicity
"intended to inform the public that the primary employer's
product is 'distributed by' the secondary employer."' 22 In Ed-
ward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 23 High, a construction con-
tractor who was building a store in a shopping center, became
embroiled in a labor dispute with the Building and Construction
Trades Council. While the store was under construction, the
Council distributed handbills at the shopping center entrances,
asking consumers not to patronize any of the stores in the mall
until the mall owner, DeBartolo Corporation, promised that all
construction would be performed by contractors who paid fair
wages. 24 The Board found that the union's conduct was pro-
tected by the publicity proviso"' and the Fourth Circuit
agreed.' 26 The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's
decision.
The Court assumed that High, the primary employer, was a
producer within the meaning of the publicity proviso.
27 It
noted, however, that the "distributed by" requirement was in-
tended to "'shield[] unoffending employers and others from
pressures in controversies not their own.' ,"28 Here, the handbills
called not only for a product boycott of the store under con-
struction but also for a boycott of the products sold by its coten-
ants, none of whom had any business relationship with High.
29
Consequently, the Court found "no justification for treating the
products that the cotenants distribute to the public as products
produced by" the contractor. 30
121. See F. BARTosIc & R. HARTLEY, supra note 52, § 8.07(g), at 255.
122. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147, 155 (1983).
123. Id. at 155.
124. See id. at 150, 150 n.3.
125. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council (Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.), 252
N.L.R.B. 702 (1980).
126. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
127. DeBartolo conceded this point. See 463 U.S. at 155.
128. Id. at 156 (quoting NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S.
674, 692 (1951)).
129. See id. at 156-57.
130. Id. at 157.
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In Local No. P-9, United Food & Commercial Workers
Union (George A. Hormel & Co.)131 the Board applied the
DeBartolo criteria to union publicity arising out of a corporate
campaign against the Hormel company. When the UFCW struck
Hormel in 1985, a Hormel director served as president of First
Bank Systems, Inc. Similarly, the president of Hormel served on
the board of directors of two of First Bank's subsidiaries.' 32 An-
ticipating some Hormel vulnerability because of this relation-
ship, the union engaged in picketing and handbilling at seven
First Bank subsidiaries. It characterized First Bank as a "corpo-
rate ally" and asserted that "Hormel and First Bank [Are] Un-
fair to Labor.'
'1 33
The Board found that First Bank was a neutral secondary
employer and that the union's publicity was not protected by
the proviso. 3' Although the handbills did not meet the truthful-
ness requirement inherent in the proviso,135 the critical determi-
nation was that First Bank did not "distribute" Hormel's prod-
ucts.'36 The Board noted that although three of the seven
involved subsidiary banks received money for banking services
from Hormel, they had no connection with the chain of distribu-
tion of Hormel's food products.1 31 The Board further rejected
the Union's argument that revenue was a Hormel "product."
Such a finding "could mean that any person or business that has
any contact with any money generated by Hormel is a distribu-
tor of Hormel's products, and therefore may be enmeshed in any
of Hormel's primary labor disputes."'
This decision and DeBartolo will have a major impact on
union secondary pressure tactics in corporate campaigns. Under
the Board's rationale, coercive boycotts directed at insurance
companies or even corporate shareholders may not be saved by
the publicity proviso and, thus, may violate the NLRA.3 e
131. 281 N.L.R.B. 986 (1986).
132. See id. at 986.
133. Id. at 987.
134. The Board similarly found that the picketing engaged in by the union violated
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). See id. at 986.
135. The handbills misleadingly claimed that First Bank was involved in Hormel's
labor policies. See id. at 987.
136. Id. at 988.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Local P-9 also illustrates that nonconventional boycott activity such as is fre-
[Vol. 40
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5. First Amendment Issues
Unions have invoked the protections of the first amendment
to the United States Constitution in their attempts to defend
against unfair labor practice charges based upon handbill distri-
butions. 40 No court has reached the constitutional question; in-
deed, the Supreme Court recently avoided the issue in Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construc-
tion Trades Council.'4 Noting that the handbill distribution at
issue was peaceful and unaccompanied by picketing or patrol-
ling, the Court in DeBartolo found that such "expressive activ-
ity' 42 could be considered commercial speech entitled to first
amendment protection. Nevertheless, the Court read section
8(b)(4)(ii) "as not covering nonpicketing publicity ... urging a
complete boycott of the retailer because he handles products
produced by nonunion shops.' 1 43 It therefore evaded considera-
tion of the constitutional issue."4
E. Hot Cargo Agreements
Under section 8(e) 45 an employer may not agree with a
quently used in corporate campaigns can be coercive under § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). See also
United Scenic Artists (Theatre Techniques, Inc.), Local 29, 243 N.L.R.B. 27 (1979)
(threat of monetary sanctions is unlawfully coercive), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 655 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 990 (1982); Datz, supra
note 8, at 89 n.34.
140. See Catalytic, Inc. v. Monmouth & Ocean County Bldg. Trades Council, 829
F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1573 (1988); Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1392
(1988); accord Edward J. DeBartolo Co. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1983) (Court
avoided first amendment issue by remanding to Board for consideration of whether
handbilling was "coercive" within meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)).
141. 108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988).
142. Id. at 1397.
143. Id. at 1401 (footnote omitted).
144. See id. at 1398. The Court relied on the rule of construction espoused in NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979): "[Wlhere an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will con-
strue the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress." 108 S. Ct. at 1397 (citing 440 U.S. at 499-501, 504).
145. Section 8(e) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any em-
ployer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby
such employer ceases or refrains . . . from handling. . . or otherwise dealing
in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with
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union to refrain from dealing in the products of another em-
ployer or to cease doing business with another person. The pro-
hibition against these "hot cargo" agreements may be triggered
in the corporate organizing campaign context by an unlawful
secondary boycott that has the effect of preventing the second-
ary company from dealing with the target employer.
For example, a union may picket and distribute handbills at
Joe's Restaurant, a secondary neutral, advocating that the cus-
tomers cease patronizing Joe's because the restaurant deals with
Sunshine Baking Co., a target employer. This type of secondary
pressure clearly is unlawful under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the
Supreme Court's Safeco 46 decision if it has the effect of induc-
ing Joe's Restaurant to cease doing business with Sunshine Bak-
ing Co. In addition, any agreement - express or implied - be-
tween Joe's Restaurant and the union to refrain from trading
with Sunshine Baking Co. constitutes an unfair labor practice
under section 8(e). 47
F. Neutrality Agreements
A significant objective of any corporate organizing campaign
is to restrain a target employer from opposing a union's organi-
zational efforts. 14s In order to achieve its goal, a union often
pressures an employer through publicity, boycotts, and similar
tactics discussed above. In some circumstances, however, an em-
ployer in the early stages of a campaign will voluntarily enter
any other person, and any ... [such] agreement shall be to such extent unen-
forceable and void.
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982).
146. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
147. See Fletcher, supra note 93, at 105. The "work preservation" exception to the
proscriptions of § 8(e) is unlikely to arise in a corporate organizing campaign. Under this
exception, when the union's boycott objective is to preserve the work of the primary
employer's employees-a primary and not a secondary objective-any agreement by the
primary employer to refrain from dealing with the secondary is lawful. See NLRB v.
Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters, Local Union No. 638, 429 U.S. 507, 528 (1977);
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 645 (1967) ("The touchstone is
whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the con-
tracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees" or whether it seeks to benefit "other than
the boycotting employees or other employees of the primary employer."); cf. Local 388,
United Ass'n of Journeymen (Daily Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.), 280 N.L.R.B. 1260
(1986).
148. Cf. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at A-7 (Jan. 9, 1987).
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into a neutrality agreement with a campaigning union.149
An employer may agree with a union "neither [to] discour-
age nor encourage the Union efforts to organize [certain] em-
ployees."'150 It similarly may agree not to oppose the union ac-
tively if the union conducts itself in a proper manner.' 5' These
agreements commonly require an employer to remain "neutral"
toward union organizing efforts at its nonunion facilities. 152 The
agreement makes a union's organizational campaign easier; with-
out active employer opposition, the union's chance for a success-
ful campaign is enhanced.
153
The use of a neutrality agreement to forestall organizational
resistance may not completely ensure employer neutrality. In-
deed, such an agreement may be challenged in several ways.
Neither the Board nor the courts have determined whether a
neutrality agreement is a mandatory, permissive, or illegal sub-
ject of bargaining, although commentators suggest that it is a
permissive subject.5 4 An employer who wishes to isolate its sub-
sidiaries from its neutrality pledge may argue that the scope of
any agreement is limited only to a single facility. Similarly, a
rival union, one not a party to any neutrality agreement between
an employer and another union, may challenge the agreement's
enforceability.
1. Subsidiary of Contracting Employer
A neutrality agreement is a contract that clearly binds two
parties: an employer and a union. Both parties agree to be
bound by the terms of that agreement. Not so clearly defined,
however, is the effect of a neutrality agreement on any nonu-
149. According to one commentator, a neutrality agreement more likely will be used
by a large corporation with a strong union history and the need for centralized bargain-
ing negotiations. See Guzick, Employer Nonadversarial Model of Labor Relations, 6 IN-
nus. REL. L.J. 421, 439 (1984).
150. Id. at 435, 437 n.3.
151. See id. at 438-39.
152. See id. at 422; Kramer, Miller & Bierman, Neutrality Agreements: The New
Frontier in Labor Relations - Fair Play or Foul?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 39, 39 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter Kramer].
153. See generally Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 211, at D-1 (Oct. 29, 1980).
154. See Craft, The Employer Neutrality Pledge: Issues, Implications, and Pros-
pects, 31 LAB. L.J. 753, 759 (1980); Kramer, supra note 152, at 49-53; Guzick, supra note
149, at 447.
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nionized, wholly-owned independent subsidiary of the employer.
For example, Widget & Bolt Co. enters into a neutrality agree-
ment with a union. Later, the union expresses an intention to
organize the employees at Widget Parts Corp., a wholly owned
subsidiary of Widget & Bolt Co. In order to avoid the restric-
tions imposed by the agreement, Widget & Bolt Co. asserts that
the subsidiary is not a party to the agreement and cannot be
bound by its terms. Following this rationale, Widget Parts Corp.
has no obligation to remain neutral toward the union's organiz-
ing efforts at its facility.
Under the NLRA, wholly owned subsidiaries are treated as
"separate employers" if there is no interrelation of operations,
common management, common ownership or financial control,
or centralized control of labor relations.155 Because a Board find-
ing that a subsidiary is a separate employer under the NLRA
may exempt it from a parent employer's obligations,"'6 the sub-
sidiary may make a persuasive argument that it should not be
bound by a neutrality agreement entered into between the par-
ent company and the union. As one commentator has noted, the
parties initially are free to denominate which subsidiaries are to
be bound by the neutrality agreement; if they choose not to ex-
ercise this privilege, the independent subsidiary should not be
held to the parent's obligation.
57
2. Section 8(a)(2) Allegations
Assume the following scenario: the Teamsters and the Auto
Workers compete to organize employees at Gofast Car Co. Al-
though the Auto Workers and Gofast have entered into a neu-
trality agreement, the Teamsters may choose to challenge the
validity of that agreement under section 8(a)(2),15 1 which pro-
155. See South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
425 U.S. 800, 802 & n.3 (1976); Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v.
Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam); Soule Glass &
Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981); Alabama Metal Prods., Inc. (Alumi-
num Brick & Glass Workers), 280 N.L.R.B. 1090 (1986); see also supra notes 84-86 and
accompanying text.
156. See Frank N. Smith Assocs. (Finger Lakes & Vicinity Dist. Council of
Carpenters), 194 N.L.R.B. 212, 218 (1971).
157. See Kramer, supra note 152, at 54. For a discussion to the contrary, see Guzick,
supra note 149, at 445-47.
158, Section 8(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
[Vol. 40
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vides that an employer cannot "interfere with" or "contribute
financial or other support to" a labor organization. The Team-
sters can argue that the neutrality agreement between the Auto
Workers and Gofast constitutes unlawful support to the Auto
Workers; the restriction of Gofast's ability to oppose the Auto
Workers's organizing efforts interferes with and supports organi-
zation of Gofast's employees by the Auto Workers. 15 If the
agreement is found to be unlawful, the Auto Workers will lose
any advantage gained from Gofast's contractually imposed neu-
trality, thereby putting the Teamsters in a more equally bal-
anced campaign position.
Should a rival union, like the Teamsters in the example
above, make a section 8(a)(2) allegation, the Board will examine
whether the "natural tendency" of the neutrality agreement is to
"inhibit employees in their choice of a bargaining representa-
tive. °16 0 Discriminatory conduct favoring one rival union over
another clearly violates section 8(a)(2). For example, an em-
ployer may not recognize a favored union except in certain
circumstances.161
Undeniably, an employer may noncoercively declare a pref-
erence for one union over another without violating section
8(a)(2).162 To employees, however, a neutrality agreement may
appear to be not only an expression of preference for the signa-
tory union but also an indication that the employer is more will-
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
159. See Kramer, supra note 152, at 39.
160. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc. (American Fed'n of Nurses, Local 535), 223
N.L.R.B. 322, 322 (1976).
161. See Signal Transformer Co. (Local 431, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers), 265
N.L.R.B. 272 (1982) (employer must remain neutral when presented with a majority of
cards by an insurgent union); RCA Del Caribe, Inc. (Rafael, Cuevas Kuinlam & Local
2333, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers), 262 N.L.R.B. 963 (1982) (employer may recognize and
bargain with incumbent union even after rival union has filed a petition); Bruckner
Nursing Home (Local 1115, Joint Bd. Nursing Home & Hosp. Employees), 262 N.L.R.B.
955 (1982) (employer can recognize one of two rival unions if the recognized union repre-
sents a majority of employees and no valid petition for representation has been filed); see
also Estreicher & Telsey, A Recast Midwest Piping Doctrine: The Case for Judicial Ac-
ceptance, 36 LAB. L.J. 14 (1985).
162. See Rold Gold, Inc. (American Bakery & Confectionary Workers), 123 N.L.R.B.
285, 286 (1959).
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ing to negotiate with one union than another.6 3 Because of that
agreement, employees arguably may be denied the congressional
imperative of "complete and unfettered freedom of choice" in
choosing a bargaining representative.'"
3. Other NLRA Implications
In addition to raising section 8(a)(2) issues, a neutrality
agreement may implicate other NLRA provisions. For example,
section 8(c) 165 protects noncoercive employer speech to employ-
ees during an organizing campaign. By its terms, a neutrality
agreement usually prohibits an employer from expressing to its
employees its views on union organization. Because of the em-
ployer's voluntary waiver of its first amendment rights through
the agreement, employees hear only a union's viewpoint and
make their decision regarding representation on that basis
alone.' 66
The Sixth Circuit considered the validity of such a waiver in
International Union, United Automobile Workers v. Dana
Corp.'6 7 There, although a union and an employer were parties
to a neutrality agreement, the union sought to enjoin the em-
ployer for disseminating antiunion communications to employ-
ees during an organizing campaign. The court found that the
employer had waived its rights to communicate with its employ-
ees. Noting that a valid waiver of constitutional rights is one
that is voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made "with full
awareness of the legal consequences,"'6 8 the court held that the
163. See Kramer, supra note 152, at 66 (citing R. WILLIAMS, P. JANICE & K. HUHN,
NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 203 (same material is in 1985 revised edition
at page 237)).
164. See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 588 (1941).
165. Section 8(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not consti-
tute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
166. For a more comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Kramer, supra note 152,
at 72-74.
167. 679 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1982).
168. Id. at 645 (citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972)).
See also Guzick, supra note 149, at 458-59.
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employer had voluntarily assumed a restriction of its first
amendment rights." 9
The waiver issue is also pertinent to the question of whether
a neutrality agreement implicates employees' section 7170 rights
to vote in a free election. Congress envisioned that employees
should have a "free and untrammeled choice"1 1 in making rep-
resentation decisions. By eliminating employer opposition, a
neutrality agreement essentially waives that freedom of choice
which, as noted by the Supreme Court in Central Hardware Co.
v. NLRB, 72 "depends in some measure on the ability of employ-
ees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization
from others."' 7 3
The public interest and national labor policy favoring free
elections also must be considered in the context of a neutrality
agreement. 7 4 The "laboratory conditions" of an election, re-
quired by the NLRA, may be spoiled by any restriction of an
employer's speech to employees and may violate both the spirit
and the policy of the NLRA. Consequently, a neutrality agree-
ment that significantly restricts the dissemination of employer
views on unionism may be challenged under section 7 as a viola-
tion of employees' entitlement to the free exercise of their orga-
nizational rights. 175
4. Enforcement
A controversy involving a neutrality agreement need not be
litigated before the Board. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has found
that a cause of action based on a breach of a neutrality agree-
169. See 679 F.2d at 645-66.
170. Section 7 provides, in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
171. NLRB v. General Shoe Corp. (Boot & Shoe Workers Union), 77 N.L.R.B. 124,
126 (1948), enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
172. 407 U.S. 539 (1975).
173. Id. at 543. See also Hudgens (Local 315, Retail Store Union), 230 N.L.R.B. 414,
416 (1977) (employees have a "right to receive information" during an organizational
campaign).
174. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir. 1971).
175. See Kramer, supra note 152, at 76-77.
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ment properly may be heard by a district court under section
301(a) of the LMRA. 17 6 In Amalgamated Clothing & Textile
Workers Union v. Facetglas, Inc.177 ACTWU and Facetglas
agreed on an election to be held among employees at a new
plant. The election agreement stipulated that Facetglas would
"'be neutral in the election and let any selection be strictly up
to its employees.' ,117 Despite this agreement, Facetglas alleg-
edly made antiunion statements to employees and indirectly
participated in the distribution of antiunion literature prior to
the election. The union sued for breach of contract, asserting ju-
risdiction under LMRA section 301(a). The Fourth Circuit re-
versed the district court's dismissal of the claims relating to
breach of the election agreement, finding that any representa-
tional issues (which should be decided by the Board) were sever-
able from the contractual issues relating to the agreement. The
contract itself, the court concluded, was enforceable under sec-
tion 301.19
The Fourth Circuit did not indicate whether Board deci-
sions or ordinary contract principles would govern the neutrality
agreement at issue in Facetglas. A court, however, may resort to
any law consistent with the implementation of federal labor pol-
icy.180 Applying this rationale to the parent-subsidiary issue, a
court may find that a subsidiary is indeed a single employer
under Board principles and may determine that it is not bound
by any neutrality agreement entered into by the parent com-
pany. On the other hand, if the court resorts to ordinary con-
tract principles, the enforceability of the agreement against a
wholly owned subsidiary would depend upon the interpretation
of that agreement in light of the unambiguous language and cir-
cumstances existing at the time of formation."'
176. Section 301(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . .. may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
177. 845 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1988).
178. Id. at 1251 (quoting election agreement).
179. See id. at 1253.
180. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
181. In Facetglas the union sought monetary damages. 845 F.2d at 1253. An injunc-
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G. Remedies
The Board has substantial power to remedy unfair labor
practices during a corporate organizing campaign. Under NLRA
section 10(a), 182 it can "draw on enlightenment gained from ex-
perience" 18 3 in fashioning a particular remedy 4 and will enjoy
considerable judicial deference by the courts. 8 5 Consequently, a
target employer should be aware both of the remedies available
and their limitations.
1. Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief sometimes is available prior to a final un-
fair labor practice determination.8 " For example, the Board's
General Counsel must seek a section 10(1)187 injunction in fed-
tion, however, also may be an appropriate remedy because of the continuing and irrepa-
rable damage to the election process.
182. This section provides, in pertinent part: "The Board is empowered ... to pre-
vent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or preven-
tion that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise . . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
183. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (citing
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1952)).
184. Under § 10(c) of the Act, the Board may require the offending party to "cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
the Act." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). See also Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793, 798 (1945); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 348 (1938).
185. See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 600 (1941); International Ass'n of
Machinists, Lodge 35 v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940).
186. See generally Schatzki, Some Observations About the Standards Applied to
Labor Injunction Litigation Under Sections 10(j) and 10(1) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 59 IND. L.J. 565 (1983-84).
187. This section provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (A), (B), or (C) of section [8(b)],
or section [8(e)] or section [8(b)(7)], the preliminary investigation of such
charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases. If, after
such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be
referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a com-
plaint should issue, he shall . . .petition any district court of the United
States . . . for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of
the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the
district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or tempo-
rary restraining order as it deems just and proper ....
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1982).
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eral court for certain unfair labor practices that are likely to
cause significant damage to an employer in a short time.188 The
petition to enjoin alleged violations of sections 8(b)(7),
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), and 8(e) must be filed with the court if the Gen-
eral Counsel finds reasonable cause to believe that the NLRA
has been violated. The court then may grant appropriate
relief. 89
A section 10(j) 190 injunction is available for any violation of
the NLRA, but the General Counsel is not required to petition
the court for this relief. If he does, the district court may again
grant such relief as it deems proper.'9 '
2. Cease-and-Desist and Other Remedies
The prevalent remedy for union unfair labor practices is a
cease-and-desist order coupled with the posting of a notice in-
forming employees of the order's contents. 2 More substantial
consequences, of course, may be imposed on an offending union.
In section 8(b)(1)(A) cases involving serious physical force and
violence, for example, the Board may revoke the union's certifi-
cation. 9 3 Section 8(b)(4) violations normally are temporarily
remedied by a section 10(1) injunction,9 but the union also
may be required to advise employees and others that it is with-
drawing its objections to their patronage of the target
employer. 95
188. See 2 LABOR LAW, supra note 43, at 1649.
189. See Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1975).
190. This section provides, in pertinent part: "The Board shall have power, upon
issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b) charging that any person has en-
gaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any district court of the
United States. .. for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order ... ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(j) (1982).
191. See NLRB Case Handling Manual (CCH) S 30,162, at 10,348 (1979) (General
Counsel report on the use of § 10(j) injunction proceedings).
192. See generally 2 LABOR LAW, supra note 43, at 1654-63, 1682-92.
193. See Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Carborundum Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 862
(1975), enforced, 540 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). This
drastic remedy is rarely imposed, however. See Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
194. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 554 v. NLRB, 262 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 40
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3. Damage Actions
Section 303196 of the LMRA provides a damage remedy to a
party injured by a section 8(b)(4) violation. 1  Under this sec-
tion, a private party injured by prohibited secondary activity
may sue the union for damages in federal or state court 98 and
obtain a jury trial.
The language of section 303(b) creates a right of action in
"[w]hoever shall be injured in his business or property" by the
unlawful activity and provides that the injured party may "re-
cover the damages by him sustained."'199 Recovery of damages is
limited to actual compensatory damages, 00 which must be non-
196. This section provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry
or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any ac-
tivity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section [8(b)(4)] of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any
violation of subsection (a) may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301 hereof without
respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction
of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of
the suit.
29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982). See International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v.
Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952) (sections 8(b)(4) and 303 are independent
remedies); Note, Sections 8(b)(4) and 303: Independent Remedies Against Union Prac-
tices Udner the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 YALE L.J. 745, 745-47 (1952).
197. See Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344 (1983) (section 303 provides a remedy only
for violations of § 8(b)(4)).
198. The jurisdiction conferred on the courts by § 303(b) is also subject "to the
limitations and provisions of" section 301. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982). For example, there is
no minimum monetary requirement and no need for diversity of citizenship in order for
an injured party to sue in federal court. See Juneau Spruce, 342 U.S. at 241.
199. 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1982). Although a § 303 action for damages accrues at the
time damage occurs, the limitation period begins to run only when the damages become
reasonably ascertainable. See Railing v. United Mine Workers, 445 F.2d 353 (4th Cir.
1971). Section 303 contains no statute of limitations; therefore, the law of the forum
state determines the timeliness of a § 303 action. See United Mine Workers v. Meadow
Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52, 61 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959); see also
Carruthers Ready-Mix, Inc. v. Cement Masons Local No. 521, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2077
(W.D. Tenn. 1983) (six-month statute of limitations contained in § 10(b) would be ap-
plied in an action under § 303).
200. The Supreme Court has held that "[p]unitive damages for violations of § 303
conflict with the congressional judgment, reflected both in the language of the federal
statute and in its legislative history, that recovery for an employer's business losses
caused by a union's peaceful secondary activity proscribed by § 303 should be limited to
actual compensatory damages." Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260
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speculative and the direct and proximate result of the pro-
scribed conduct.20 1 Attorneys' fees are not recoverable.202 Fur-
ther, section 303 actions may be brought only against a union,
not against individuals, since the unlawful conduct must be an
unfair labor practice committed by a labor organization. 203
A Board determination of a section 8(b)(4) violation gener-
ally will be given res judicata effect with respect to a subsequent
section 303 suit. Similarly, Board dismissal of an unfair labor
practice complaint will bar a section 303 suit.204 If the General
Counsel refuses to issue a complaint on a section 8(b)(4) charge,
however, a later section 303 suit is not barred because the re-
fusal to act is the result of an ex parte investigation rather than
Board adjudication.205
III. PENSION FUND LEVERAGE
In 1985, as a show of support for the Steelworkers' corpo-
rate campaign against Phelps Dodge Corporation, the American
(1964) (footnotes omitted). Further, injunctive relief is not available under § 303. See
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 170 F.2d 902 (8th Cir.
1948); City of Galveston v. International Org. of Masters, 338 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Tex.
1972).
201. See Morton, 377 U.S. at 261; Wickham Contracting Co. v. Board of Educ., 715
F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1983); Abreen Corp. v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 709 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); C & K Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 704
F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1983). Mathematical exactness and precision are not required. See
Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931). For a summary
listing of damages that may be awarded, see 2 LABOR LAW, supra note 43, at 1184 &
Supp. 1982-86, at 458.
202. See Summit Valley Indus. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners,
456 U.S. 717 (1982) (reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in bringing about the cessation
of the illegal work stoppage, including proceedings before the Board, are not recoverable
under the "American Rule"); see also Abreen, 709 F.2d at 760; C & K Coal, 704 F.2d at
698.
203. See Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 233 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1956).
Further, a union will not be held liable for the acts of individual members unless "some
one or more persons in authority were responsible for what transpired." International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 226 F.2d 875 (9th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956); see also Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966).
204. See International Wire v. Local 38, Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 475 F.2d 1078 (6th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Truck Transport, Inc. v. In-
dustrial Workers, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2313 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
205. See Clark Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 510
F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1975); see generally 2 LABOR LAW, supra note 43, at 1182.
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Federation of Teachers removed $450 million in pension fund
assets from Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company. Not coinci-
dentally, the chairman of the copper company sat on the board
of directors of Manufacturers Hanover. °0 This type of pension
fund leverage20 rapidly could become a favorite tactic in any
corporate campaign. By threatening the withdrawal of pension
funds, a bank may be pressured to cease lending to a target em-
ployer. The resulting financial pressure placed on the employer
may compel it to recognize the union.20 s
The Employees' Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)209 covers all nongovernmental pension funds that may
be used as leverage in a corporate organizing campaign. A union
using this tactic may violate any number of ERISA sections
210
and, thus, may be liable for losses resulting from a breach of
fiduciary duty in addition to attorneys' fees.2 n Unfortunately for
a target employer, however, only certain parties have standing to
sue in federal court to prevent an ERISA violation: a participant
in the plan, a beneficiary, a fiduciary, or the Secretary of
Labor.2 12
A more viable remedy for a target employer exists under the
NLRA. Pension fund leverage may constitute illegal secondary
activity under section 8(b)(4)(ii) if an employer can prove the
criteria required by that provision. A showing that coercive eco-
nomic leverage has the object of causing any person to cease do-
ing business with another person213 will be sufficient to invoke
206. See Daily Lab. Report (BNA) No. 34, at A-2 (Feb. 20, 1985).
207. See Kaiser, Labor's New Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage -Can Labor Le-
gally Beat Its Plowshares Into Swords?, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 412 (1982). See gener-
ally Northrup & Northrup, Union Divergent Investing of Pensions: A Power, Non-Em-
ployee Relations Issue, 2 J. LAB. RES. 191 (1981).
208. See Kaiser, supra note 207, at 413.
209. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1982).
210. See, e.g. id. § 1104 (a) (fiduciary has duty of loyalty to act for the exclusive
benefit of plan beneficiaries).
211. See id. § 1132(g).
212. See id. § 1132(a).
213. Neither a union nor its agents must be involved in a labor dispute for their
actions to be governed by § 8(b)(4)(ii):
There need not be an actual dispute with the boycotted employer ... for the
activity to fall within this category, so long as the tactical object of the agree-
ment ... is that employer, or benefits to other than the boycotting employees
or other employees of the primary employer thus making the agreement or
boycott secondary in its aim.
1989]
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the NLRA's protection.214 Alternatively, an employer may seek
damages for improper economic leverage under section 303 of
the LMRA.2 15
IV. ANTITRUST LIABILITY
Even beyond the prohibitions imposed by the NLRA
against unfair labor practices, a union's actions in conducting a
corporate organizing campaign may violate the antitrust laws. 16
For example, a union may attempt to coerce a manufacturer not
to deal with a nonunion distributor217 or may combine with non-
labor groups as a method of pressuring the target employer.218
Use of antitrust laws should be a favorite employer remedial tool
because the campaigning union will be liable for treble damages
and attorneys' fees if its conduct is found to be illegal. 1 9
Some union conduct is exempted from antitrust scrutiny
under the immunity granted by the Clayton Act. 2 0 Courts have
interpreted this so-called "statutory exemption" to apply to uni-
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 645 (1967) (footnote omitted).
See also Kaiser, supra note 207, at 439.
214. See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
216. The antitrust laws have been asserted infrequently against an employer who
resists union organization. In Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 638 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1980), however, the union's suit against Stevens alleged employer antitrust viola-
tions such as wage-fixing, blacklisting, and use of antiunion publicity campaigns. The
court, noting that the union failed to show a restraint on competition in marketing, id. at
488, rejected the union's claims. It found that the union's allegations did "no more than
complain of efforts to impede its activities as a union entirely unaccompanied or uncom-
plicated by any element of monopolistic effect upon competition in the marketplace for
goods or services." Id. at 490. See also Kaminsky, The Antitrust Labor Exemption: An
Employer Perspective, 16 SEroN HALL L. REV. 4, 31 (1986); Miller, Antitrust: A New
Tool for Organized Labor, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 127 (1982).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Olympia Provision & Baking Co., 282 F. Supp. 819
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), afl'd, 393 U.S. 480 (1968).
218. See, eg., Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3100 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
219. Section 4 of the Sherman Act provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States . . ., without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
220. Id. §§ 12-27, 44; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1982).
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lateral conduct by the union22 1 when the union acts in its own
self-interest and not in combination with a nonlabor group.
222
The courts also have applied a nonstatutory exemption in par-
ticular situations not covered by the Clayton Act. This exemp-
tion has primary application in the collective bargaining context,
but courts have expansively interpreted the nonstatutory ex-
emption to apply to some organizing activity as well. 223 As with
the statutory exemption, however, conduct of the union and em-
ployers or employer groups will be exempt only if the union's
objectives are lawful and are aimed at protecting wages and
working conditions. 4
A. The Statutory Exemption
At one time, union activities clearly were regulated under
the antitrust laws. The Sherman Act of 1890 prohibited "con-
spiracies, combinations in the form of trusts or otherwise, and
agreements in restraint of trade" and "monopolies. '2 25 Because
the Sherman Act focused on free market control by powerful en-
tities, alone or in combination with competitors, it was easily of-
fended by labor organizations seeking to increase the price of
labor and monopolize the labor supply.
226
In the Danbury Hatters case,2 the Supreme Court found
that a product boycott designed to force a manufacturer to
unionize its shops violated the Sherman Act. In later cases, how-
221. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (section 20 im-
munizes "trade union activities"); see also Kaminsky, supra note 216, at 25; accord
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482,
488 (1979) (section 6 exemption only for benefit of labor and cannot be asserted by em-
ployer), vacated, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
222. See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 219; Adams, Ray & Rosenberg v. William Morris
Agency, 411 F. Supp. 403, 407 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
223. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625-26
(1975); Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1987); Larry V.
Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Penn. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368, 1373
(3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
224. See, e.g., Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 751 F.2d
653, 659-60 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1986).
225. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
226. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 20 (1978); Marks, Labor and Antitrust:
Striking a Balance Without Balancing, 35 AiR. U.L. REv. 699, 704 (1986).
227. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (plaintiff alleged that hat manufacturers'
union illegally boycotted its business).
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ever, the Sherman Act often was narrowly construed, and the
Court determined that Congress intended to prohibit only un-
reasonable restraints of trade.22s Nevertheless, Congress sought
to close the loopholes of the Sherman Act when it enacted the
Clayton Act in 1914. Under section 6 of the Clayton Act, "the
labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce, ') 229 and therefore, a union is not subject to antitrust
prohibitions if it "lawfully carr[ies] out [its] legitimate ob-
jects. '23 0 Section 20 of the Clayton Act prohibits injunctions
against peaceful strikes, picketing, boycotts, and other employee
conduct in a labor dispute involving "terms or conditions of
employment."23'
Although Congress evidently believed that sections 6 and 20
of the Clayton Act provided labor unions with an exemption
from the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court had its own inter-
pretation. In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering23 2 the Court
found that a union's secondary boycott was not exempt from an-
titrust scrutiny because section 6 protected only the "lawful" ac-
228. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
230. Id.
231. Section 20 provides, in pertinent part:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the
United States,... in any case between an employer and employees, or be-
tween employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons
employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dis-
pute concerning terms and conditions of employment, unless necessary to pre-
vent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making
the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law...
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or
persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employ-
ment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending,
advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at
any place where any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of
peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully per-
suading any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to
patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, ad-
vising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from
paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged, in such dispute,
any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably as-
sembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or
thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any
party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be consid-
ered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). Clearly, § 20 does not exempt or apply to secondary activities.
232. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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tivities of the union and section 20 protected only a labor dis-
pute between employees and their immediate employer.233 In
response, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act,2 34 which
relieved the federal courts of authority to issue injunctions
against peaceful union conduct. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act further exempted certain types of conduct from injunc-
tion 31 It also repudiated the Duplex Printing holding by defin-
ing a labor dispute to include any dispute about terms or
conditions of employment "regardless of whether or not the dis-
putants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.
'236
Although the Supreme Court did not immediately retreat,237
233. Id. at 469-70; see also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters'
Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295
(1925); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
234. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
235. Section 4 provides, in pertinent part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participat-
ing or interested in such dispute. . . from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any em-
ployer organization... ;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or inter-
ested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance,
or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action
or suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dis-
pute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts here-
tofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore
specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence
the acts heretofore specified . . ..
Id. § 104.
236. Id. § 113(c).
237. See Local 167 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934)
(Sherman Act violated by combination of nonlabor conspirators).
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its Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader 3 decision signalled a new view
of the relationship between union conduct and the antitrust
laws. In Apex the union conducted a violent sitdown strike
aimed at enforcing its demands for a closed shop. The Court re-
fused to enjoin this activity, finding that it did not violate anti-
trust laws because the employer did not show that the strike
"operated to restrain commercial competition in some substan-
tial way. '238 The Court further noted that:
Since the enactment of the declaration in [section] 6 of the
Clayton Act ... it would seem plain that restraints on the sale
of the employee's services to the employer, however much they
curtail the competition among employees, are not in them-
selves combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or
commerce under the Sherman Act.
2 0
A subsequent decision, United States v. Hutcheson,24' criti-
cized the "unduly restrictive judicial construction ' 242 of sections
6 and 20 of the Clayton Act and section 4 of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act. The Hutcheson Court held that the protected activities
enumerated in section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act also were
entitled to antitrust immunity under section 20 of the Clayton
Act "[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not
combine with non-labor groups.
'24 3
In H. A. Artists & Associates v. Actors' Equity Associa-
tion24-4 the Supreme Court found that a union must act in its
own self-interest and not in combination with a nonlabor group
in order to benefit from the statutory exemption.245 Because sec-
tion 6 immunizes unions that" 'lawfully carry[] out' their 'legiti-
mate object[ives],' ",246 the first prong of the test requires that a
union's activities occur in the context of a "labor dispute" -
any controversy concerning terms and conditions of employ-
ment.247  The second prong requires that a union act
238. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
239. Id, at 497.
240. Id. at 502-03.
241. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
242. Id. at 236.
243. 312 U.S. at 232 (footnote omitted).
244. 451 U.S. 704, 715 (1981).
245. See id. at 714-16.
246. Id. at 714.
247. Id. at 714 n.14; See also California State Council of Carpenters Inc. v. Associ-
[Vol. 40
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"unilaterally."248
In sum, the statutory exemption will apply only if: (1) the
labor organization acts in its own self-interest by lawful means
in pursuit of legitimate union objectives, 24 '9 and (2) the labor or-
ganization does not combine with any nonlabor groups. If the
union meets these criteria, a court will not examine "the wisdom
or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or un-
selfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are
the means.
'250
1. Union Self-Interest
Application of the statutory exemption depends in part on
whether the union lawfully puirsues a legitimate objective.251 Be-
cause the Hutcheson Court 252 read the definition of "labor dis-
pute" to encompass both secondary and primary activity, both
types of union conduct were found to be "legitimate objects"
and were included within the section 20 exemption.25 3 Under
this interpretation, a union, as part of its corporate organizing
campaign, could engage in secondary pressure and still be im-
mune from antitrust liability.
254
Subsequent lower court decisions, however, have limited
this expansive reading of the statutory exemption. In IPC Dis-
tributors v. Chicago Moving Picture Machine Operators Union,
ated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
459 U.S. 519 (1983).
248. See H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 717; Allen Bradley Co. v. International Local
Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 807-09 (1945); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-
Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 531 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
Although § 6 does not exempt union combinations with nonlabor groups, it does protect
combinations of unions and other labor groups. See American Fed'n of Musicians v. Car-
roll, 391 U.S. 99, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 902 (1968).
249. For the statutory exemption to apply, both requirements must be satisfied. See
United States v. Drivers Local Union No. 639, 32 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1940).
250. Hutcheson v. United States, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
251. See Adams, Ray & Rosenburg v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 411 F. Supp.
403, 410 (C.D. Cal. 1976) ("[T]he test to determine if a union's actions are in its 'self-
interest' has not been precisely formulated. But the principle that emerges from the rele-
vant cases is that a union's acts are in its 'self-interest' . if they bear a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate union interest.").
252. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
253. See id. at 233-36.
254. See Miller, supra note 216, at 59.
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Local 110,255 for example, the district court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that a union's refusal to show a particu-
lar movie did not trigger the statutory exemption when the re-
fusal was not pursuant to any bargaining aim. The court found
that legitimate objectives were those "normally related to some
aspect of the employer-employee relationship. 2 56 This interpre-
tation of the Hutcheson rationale is the prevailing viewpoint.257
Thus, labor dispute objectives that clearly involve terms
and conditions of employment - higher wages, shorter hours,
and improved working conditions"' - fall within the exemp-
tion. This encompasses elements of many corporate organizing
campaigns. Union actions that only are tangentially related to
terms and conditions of employment are not legitimate objec-
tives. For example, a union that owns a store cannot use its bar-
gaining power to require an employer to deal exclusively with
that store. 5
The circuit courts of appeals disagree about whether a
union objective that results in an unfair labor practice is illegiti-
mate. In the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the test appears to be
that unlawful activity grows out of a labor dispute - and, thus,
is a legitimate object entitled to the statutory exemption - if
the employers are "substantially aligned."26 0 A union engaging
in illegal secondary pressure pursues an illegitimate objective
only if the secondary employer is not "substantially aligned"
255. 132 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
256. Id. at 299.
257. See United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 212 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1954);
Miller, supra note 216, at 58-60.
258. See National Ass'n of Women's & Children's Apparel Salesmen, Inc. v. FTC,
479 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local Union No. 88, 410 F.2d
650, 653 (8th Cir. 1969).
259. See Marks, supra note 226, at 729; see also H. A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors'
Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 722 (1981); Thompson Newspapers, Inc. v. Toledo Typo-
graphical Union No. 63, 387 F. Supp. 351, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Streiffer v. Seafarers
Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602, 607 (E.D. La. 1958). But see Jacksonville Bulk Ter-
minals, Inc. v. ILA, 457 U.S. 702, 713 n.12 (1982); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Gro-
cery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 559-61 (1938).
260. See Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1364-
65 (8th Cir. 1980) (case involves or grows out of a labor dispute only when the offending
activity furthers union's economic interest in a labor dispute); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 362 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir.), affd by an
equally divided court, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
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with the primary employer. The Ninth Circuit has established
an even broader test. It has held that if a "labor dispute" exists,
the objective is legitimate, even if the union is engaging in un-
lawful secondary activity." 1
2. Nonlabor Groups
A typical corporate campaign involves cooperation with a
variety of nonlabor entities, including citizens groups, environ-
mental groups, stockholders, and competitors of the employer.
This raises a question about which of these groups may combine
with the union without destroying the union's antitrust immu-
nity. Clearly, a union may petition a governmental body to take
action favorable to it. 26 2 Further, the Supreme Court has rea-
soned that a union is acting unilaterally - and, thus, is exempt
from antitrust scrutiny - when it agrees to combine with per-
sons or groups with whom the union has "'job or wage competi-
tion or some other economic interrelationship affecting legiti-
mate union interests.' "263 For example, in H. A. Artists &
Associates v. Actor's Equity Association264 the Court found that
"some other economic interrelationship ' 216 existed between ac-
tors' agents and an actors' union that regulated the fees agents
could charge. The agents were independent contractors and did
not compete with the actors for jobs or wages. Nevertheless, the
agents controlled the actors' access to jobs and could undermine
the wage structure established by the union.
Particularly analogous to the corporate campaign context is
the California District Court decision in Adolph Coors Co. v.
Wallace.28 There, several citizens' groups and coalitions assisted
a union boycott against Coors, persuading a radio station to can-
261. Smith's Management Corp. v. IBEW Local Union No. 357, 737 F.2d 788, 792
(9th Cir. 1984).
262. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965); Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961).
263. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (quoting Carroll v.
American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)), reh'g denied, 393
U.S. 902 (1968) ; see also Warnick v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 593 F. Supp. 66, 70 (E.D.
Wash. 1984); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 578, 588-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 708 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1983).
264. 451 U.S. 704 (1981).
265. Id. at 721-22.
266. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3100 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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cel "Coors Day," during which Coors employees were to help
raise money for the station. Coors sued under the antitrust laws,
alleging that the boycott of Coors products was in restraint of
trade and had the purpose of driving Coors out of business.
2 67
The court held268 that these groups were not "non-labor" be-
cause that term necessarily applies to only "entities with com-
mercial or competitive goals [contrary] to that of the targeted"
employer.6 9
In a corporate organizing campaign, union tactics may in-
clude combination with a target employer's competitors to pres-
sure that employer. Under the Coors test, any agreement by
competitors to boycott the target employer in exchange for the
union's promise to cease secondary activity against them would
violate the antitrust laws unless that agreement is protected by
the nonstatutory exemption.1
7 0
B. The Nonstatutory Exemption
The nonstatutory exemption often is used when allegedly
unlawful conduct affects parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment.2 7 1 The courts, however, have applied this exemption to
other union-employer agreements. Those agreements that arise
in the organizing context are discussed below.
1. Development
In Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co.272 the Supreme Court found the antitrust laws
did not reach a proposed collective bargaining agreement clause
267. See id. at 3103.
268. The court also found that the boycott was a "labor dispute"; the union commit-
tee's concern that Coors engaged in "union-busting" activities concerned "terms and
conditions of employment" within § 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Id. at 3106-07.
269. Id. at 3107.
270. See Fletcher, supra note 93, at 117.
271. See Kaminsky, supra note 216, at 32-34.
272. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). Jewel Tea has no majority opinion, but many commenta-
ters believe that Justice White's opinion is the authoritative view of the law. See, e.g.,
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 623
(1973); Case Comment, Establishing an Objective Intent Standard for the Labor Anti-
trust Exemption: Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Association, 64
MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1280-84 (1980).
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that restricted the hours during which butchers could operate
their businesses. In so holding, the basic test for the nonstatu-
tory exemption emerged:
Employers and unions are required to bargain about wages,
hours and working conditions, and this fact weighs heavily in
favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on these subjects.
But neither party need bargain about other matters and either
party commits an unfair labor practice if it conditions its bar-
gaining upon discussions of a nonmandatory subject.
Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours
restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately re-
lated to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions'
successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide
arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union
policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with nonla-
bor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor
policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. We
think that it is.2 3
The Court reformulated this "intimately related" test in
1975 in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local Union No. 100."4 There, a union conducting an organizing
campaign forced a general contractor to agree to subcontract
only to union firms in accordance with the rest of a multiem-
ployer bargaining association. When the contractor sued the
union under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the Court
found that the union was not exempt from antitrust liability
under either the statutory or nonstatutory exemption: "[T]he
methods the union chose are not immune from antitrust sanc-
tions," the Court stated, "simply because the goal is legal ...
This kind of direct restraint on the business market has sub-
stantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential, that
would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition
over wages and working conditions. 27 5
273. 381 U.S. at 689-90 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
274. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
275. Id. at 625 (emphasis added). According to one commentator, "A direct market
restraint is one that, by its own terms, relates to the output (product or service) of the
firm." Marks, supra note 226, at 742 n.231.
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2. Applicability of the Nonstatutory Exemption Outside the
Collective Bargaining Context
As noted by the Supreme Court in Connell Construction,
the antitrust laws cannot be used to frustrate employees' right
to organize and act to improve working conditions.2 76 Unless
union restraints "follow naturally from the elimination of com-
petition over wages and working conditions,"2 7 the nonstatutory
exemption will not apply.
Undeniably, the court will look to certain factors to deter-
mine whether to apply the nonstatutory exemption to direct re-
straints outside a collective bargaining relationship. An indus-
try-wide boycott of employers directed toward employees in
which the union has no representational interest is not entitled
to protection. 8 Other factors allowing a court to deny the non-
statutory exemption include a union's arbitrary exclusion of
nonunion firms from competition, freezing the terms by which
the industry conducts business, and consolidating control of a
market to one or a group of employers.279
C. Effect of Labor Law Determinations
In actions involving alleged union violations of the antitrust
laws, a court will look first to labor law to determine the legality
of the union's conduct.2 0 A finding of illegality under the
NLRA, however, is not dispositive of the exemption issue.28 ' In
fact, circuit courts disagree on the weight to be accorded to labor
law determinations.
The Second Circuit has held that when the Board has deter-
276. See 421 U.S. at 622; see also Richards v. Neilson Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898,
905 (9th Cir. 1987).
277. 421 U.S. at 625.
278. See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 653 n.8 (noting
the "novel" organizational tactic used in Connell), reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 899 (1982).
279. See 810 F.2d at 906.
280. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 688-90 (1965); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
281. See Berman Enters. v. Local 333, United Marine Div., Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 644 F.2d 930, 933, 935-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); see also
Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793, 801-02 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
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mined the lawfulness of a union's conduct, relitigation of those
issues may be precluded in an antitrust action.8 2 The court of
appeals formulated a two-part test for application of the collat-
eral estoppel doctrine: (1) the issue in the antitrust suit must be
identical to the issue adjudicated in the prior suit, and (2) the
findings in the prior suit must have been essential to the deter-
mination.8 3 The Third Circuit, however, has limited the appli-
cability of the doctrine to cases in which it is asserted against a
defendant who controlled its side of the litigation in the prior
determination. In Altemose Construction Co. v. Building &
Construction Trades Council2 4 the court rejected a collateral
estoppel claim asserted against a plaintiff, finding that the
Board's General Counsel, not the plaintiff, had control over the
unfair labor practice proceedings below.285
These decisions indicate that an employer may have diffi-
culty prevailing on an antitrust claim against a union that has
committed unfair labor practices. Further, when the challenged
activity is expressly or implicitly protected by the NLRA - for
example, product boycotts - the courts are likely to find the
conduct immune from scrutiny.288 Although there is some au-
thority to indicate that illegal conduct under the NLRA may be
entitled to the antitrust exemption,28 7 several courts have found
that national labor policy is furthered if such conduct is not
exempt.
28
282. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Board of Educ., 715 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1983).
283. See id. at 26-27 (citing RX Data Corp. v. Department of Social Servs., 684 F.2d
192, 197 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 157
(1979); International Wire v. Local 38, IBEW, 475 F.2d 1078, 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
284. 751 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986).
285. See id. at 661-62.
286. See, e.g., Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105, 1109-
10 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981); Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Local No.
153, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F. Supp. 850, 856 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd without opinion,
609 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079 (1980); see also Marks, supra
note 226, at 752.
287. See, e.g., Iodice v. Calabrese, 512 F.2d 383, 388, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1975); East
Tex. Motor Freight Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 568, 163
F.2d 10, 11-12 (5th Cir. 1947).
288. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 518-
19 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980); Altmose Constr. Co. v. Building & Con-
str. Trades Council, 751 F.2d 653, 661 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986);
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local No. 7, 629 F.2d 653, 660-63 (10th Cir. 1980);
James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915, 923-24 (D. Del. 1984); cf. Sun-Land
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In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers2 9 the Supreme
Court denied the antitrust exemption because a restrictive sub-
contracting clause did not "follow naturally" from the elimina-
tion of labor market competition.29 In addition, the Court found
that the clause was illegally made and, thus, violated section 8(e)
of the NLRA. The Court apparently considered the labor law
and antitrust issues separately, as later indicated in Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Mullins:211 "In Connell, we decided the [section] 8(e)
issue in the first instance. It was necessary to do so to determine
whether the agreement was immune from the antitrust laws."29 2
This language seems to indicate that the application of antitrust
considerations will turn on an unfair labor practice finding.29
The Third Circuit, in Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New
York Shipping Association (Conex) ,294 held that the presence of
an unfair labor practice sometimes is dispositive of the exemp-
tion question. When a plaintiff seeks only injunctive or declara-
tory relief, a finding of illegality under the NLRA always should
remove the antitrust exemption.29 5 When the plaintiff seeks
damages, however, the nonstatutory exemption is still available
if the defendants could not have foreseen that their actions
would be found unlawful and if they "reasonably believed" that
their agreement was directly related to a lawful goal.2 9
Nurseries, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 793 F. 2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1986)
(valid subcontracting clause cannot serve as the basis of an antitrust claim), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1090 (1987).
289. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
290. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. The Court found that:
[T]he methods the union chose are not immune from antitrust sanctions
merely because the goal is legal .... This kind of direct restraint on the busi-
ness market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential,
that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages
and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not justi-
fied by congressional labor policy ....
421 U.S. at 625.
291. 455 U.S. 72 (1982).
292. Id. at 85.
293. For an argument that this proposition is nonsensical, see Zifchak, Labor-Anti-
trust Principles Applicable to Joint Labor-Management Conduct, 21 DuQ. L. REv. 365,
373 (1983).
294. 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S.
902 (1980).
295. See id. at 519.
296. See id. at 520-21. Two cases in the Third Circuit have adopted the Conex ap-
proach. See Feather v. United Mine Workers, 711 F.2d 530, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1983); In re
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D. Nonexempt Conduct
If a court determines that neither the statutory nor the non-
statutory exemption is available to protect a union's conduct, li-
ability does not automatically result. Instead, the court will use
traditional antitrust analysis to determine whether the conduct
violates antitrust laws.297
A labor-related antitrust case may be subjected to one of
two traditional antitrust standards of review. Under the "rule of
reason" standard, a court will look at all the circumstances: "the
facts peculiar to the business to which the [unlawful] restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
'298
Under the "per se" approach, a court may find that the union's
conduct is inherently anticompetitive and will impose liability
without a detailed inquiry into the actual competitive effect of
that conduct. 99
The circuit courts are split on which analysis to apply to
labor-related cases. The Second Circuit has adopted the rule of
reason, focusing on the restraint's overall impact on competitive
conditions.300 The Eighth Circuit similarly has found that the
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 670, 680-81 (W.D. Pa. 1984),
vacated, 756 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Duquesne Light Co. v. Interna-
tional Union, United Mine Workers, 474 U.S. 863 (1985). No other courts have discussed
this approach, although prior to Conex the Second Circuit rendered an analogous deci-
sion. See Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
297. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40, 61 &
n.19 (1978); Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
670 F.2d 421, 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); Conex, 602 F.2d at 522;
Republic Prods., Inc. v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 245 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); see generally Kirkpatrick & Johnson, Antitrust Analysis of Non-Exempt Em-
ployee or Employer Activities, 21 DUQ. L. REv. 401 (1983).
298. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also National
Society of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978).
299. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); George R. Whit-
ten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 559 (1st Cir. 1974) (per se
violations include "price fixing, group boycotts, market allocation, restrictive practices
involving patents, and certain competition-preclusive conduct by monopoly groups"),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
300. See Berman Enters., Inc. v. Local 333 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 644 F.2d
930, 936-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Commerce Tankers Corp. v. Na-
tional Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793, 802 & n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923
(1977).
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rule of reason is to be applied, with the emphasis upon whether
the restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes
and is not unduly restrictive.301 Other circuits have found the
per se approach to be the appropriate standard of review. The
First and Fourth Circuits have relied on United States Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the particular conduct at issue.0 2
The Third Circuit, while applying the per se rule in at least one
case,303 later cautioned that "[a] finding that particular union
conduct has anticompetitive effects. . . should not drive a court
inexorably to the conclusion that the union has violated the an-
titrust laws."' 30'
E. Coerced Employer Exemption
A target employer may concede to union pressure when
faced with a strike or boycott and may enter into an agreement
with which it otherwise would not involve itself. Although early
cases found that this type of combination was indeed subject to
antitrust scrutiny,3 0 5 the Supreme Court has noted recently that
under section I of the Sherman Act, there must be "'a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlaw-
ful objective.' "306 Courts have applied this same rationale in la-
bor antitrust cases to exonerate employers who were not
301. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert, dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
302. See National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. National Constr. Ass'n, 678 F.2d 492,
601 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Solony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940))
(price fixing), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1233 (1983); Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1981) (citing Fashion Originators
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)) (group boycott), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 212
(1982), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1120 (1982).
303. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 602 F.2d 494,
522 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)) (con-
certed refusals to deal), vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980).
304. Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670
F.2d 421, 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); see also Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Ackerman-Chillingworth Div. of Marsh & McLen-
nan, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
305. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948); Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939).
306. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting
Edward J. Sweeny & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451
U.S. 911 (1981)).
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"'willfully, deliberately, or knowingly participants in a conspir-
acy.' ",307 Thus, an employer's coerced involvement in a union
scheme that violates the antitrust laws may not automatically
subject it to liability.
V. RICO LIABILITY
Another employer response to a corporate organizing cam-
paign is to file suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).3 08 Eastern Airlines, for example, filed
a $1.5 billion RICO suit against the Air Lines Pilot Association
and the Machinists in 1988, charging them with conducting a
"smear campaign" to ruin Eastern's reputation."0 A comprehen-
sive analysis of this increasingly popular cause of action is be-
yond the scope of this Note; nevertheless, a discussion of the
basic structure of the statute may be helpful.
Designed as a criminal statute, RICO prohibits several types
of activities. Persons who receive income through a pattern of
racketeering activity or who acquire an interest in any racketeer-
ing enterprise may be liable under the statute. Similarly, the
statute prohibits attempts to control a business affecting inter-
state commerce through various illegal means and actions of per-
sons emlployed by or associated with an enterprise who conduct
or participate in the conduct of the enterprises's affairs though a
pattern of racketeering activity.3 10
"Racketeering activity" includes an act or threat involving
arson or extortion that is punishable under state law311 and a
"pattern" of that activity requires at least two acts occurring
within ten years.3 12 Further, the act that combines to produce
the pattern of activity must have "continuity plus
relationship. "313
307. Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting plaintiff's counsel);
see also Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d
884, 888 (2d Cir. 1970); Suburban Beverages, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 462 F. Supp.
1301, 1309-10 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
308. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
309. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 89, at A-12 (May 9, 1988).
310. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
311. See id. § 1961(1); see generally Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local Union
639, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2607, 2611-16 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
312. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
313. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985), which states:
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RICO also provides for a civil right of action for any person
injured in his business or property by reason of the prohibited
activities.3 14 Eastern Airlines apparently proceeded under this
provision. If successful, an employer may recover treble dam-
ages, costs, and attorneys' fees. 15
Despite this apparently all-encompassing employer remedy,
RICO may not reach conduct regulated by the NLRA. At least
one court has refused to hear a civil RICO suit because of its
concern that the plaintiff was attempting to circumvent the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the Board.1 e
VI. STATE CAUSES OF ACTION
An employer may choose to rely on state law remedies
against union misconduct in either a state or federal court suit.
Unless its claim is preempted, the employer may be entitled to
an injunction or compensatory and punitive damages. In a cor-
porate organizing campaign, which involves nontraditional tac-
tics and activities, the union is more likely to run afoul of non-
preempted state laws than when it is coordinating traditional
organizing activity.
A. The Preemption Doctrine
Defendants often invoke the doctrine of federal preemption
to displace state jurisdiction over disputes that substantially im-
plicate national labor policy.317 This doctrine is not statutorily
[W]hile two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient .... The legislative
history supports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not
constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report explained: "The target of (RICO] is
thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally re-
quires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activ-
ity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which com-
bines to produce a pattern."
Id. at 496 n.14, quoted in Shepard, Horn & Duston, RICO and Employment Law, 3 LAB.
LAW. 267, 285 (1987) (brackets and emphasis in original).
314. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
315. See id.
316. See Local 355, Hotel Employees v. Pier 66 Co., 599 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Fla.
1984); see also Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the NLRB as a Limitation on the Appli-
cation of RICO to Labor Disputes, 76 Ky. L.J. 201 (1987-88).
317. See generally F. BARTosic & R. HARTLEY, supra note 52, at 37-57; 2 LABOR
LAW, supra note 43, at 1504-42.
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imposed;318 instead, it is premised on the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution,319 with the task falling to the
judiciary to determine congressional intent.
320
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon321 the Su-
preme Court established one of the tests now used to analyze
the applicability of the preemption doctrine:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activi-
ties which a State purports to regulate are protected by [sec-
tion] 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an
unfair labor practice under [section] 8, due regard for the fed-
eral enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.
When an activity is arguably subject to [section] 7 or [sec-
tion] 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must
defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board if the danger of state interference with national
policy is to be averted.322
Under the Garmon test a state court cause of action is pre-
empted by Board jurisdiction if the labor activity is: (1) pro-
tected under section 7; (2) prohibited by section 8; or (3) argua-
bly protected or prohibited by those sections. If, however, the
conduct at issue is only of peripheral concern to the labor laws 323
or "touches interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and re-
sponsibility, '3 24 the employer may bring the claim under state
law.
Some conduct that is neither expressly protected nor pro-
hibited under the NLRA is nevertheless implicitly protected by
federal law because Congress intended that it be unregulated. As
noted in Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 25 the reviewing
court's inquiry should focus upon "whether 'the exercise of ple-
318. See Brown v. Hotel Employees Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1984)
(NLRA contains no explicit preemptive language).
319. US. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
320. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 188 n.12 (1978).
321. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
322. Id. at 244-45 (citations omitted).
323. Id. at 243. Cf. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
324. 359 U.S. at 244.
325. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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nary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help
would frustrate effective implementation of the [NLRA's]
processes.' ",326 Therefore, states may not impose restrictions on
economic activities of self-help unless Congress contemplated
those restrictions. 27 States also must review the structure of
federal labor law to determine whether the particular activity is
meant to be unregulated.328
Whether the conduct at issue fits within the Garmon or Ma-
chinists tests, application of the preemption doctrine requires
balancing the state's interests in regulating conduct against the
interference with the Board's ability to adjudicate disputes
under the NLRA and the risk that the state will punish conduct
permitted by the NLRA 2 0 Clearly, though, the preemption doc-
trine does not apply if the parties are not covered by the NLRA,
if the enterprise involved does not "affect commerce," or if the
Board declines to assert jurisdiction over the dispute.33 0 Simi-
larly, the doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff-employer
has had no opportunity for direct review of the union's
conduct.
331
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District
Council of Carpenters332 the Supreme Court held that a state
may enforce its trespass laws against nonemployee union picket-
ers. Although the Act arguably protected and prohibited the
union's activity, the Court declined to rely on the Garmon pri-
mary jurisdiction rationale.33 Instead, it looked to other factors.
The fact that the employer could not have brought the matter
directly before the Board without committing an independent
unfair labor practice was significant; without such a review, pre-
326. Id. at 147-48 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 390 (1969)).
327. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614-15
(1986).
328. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749-50 n.27
(1985).
329. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1983); see also Local 926, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 676 (1983); Farmer v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 300 (1977); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967).
330. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 52, at 40.
331. See Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or
Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 507, 541 (1986).
332. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
333. See id. at 200 (rationale is "relative[ly] unimportan[t] in this context").
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emption of state law would deny the employer a forum to adju-
dicate his claim.33 4 The Sears decision thus creates an exception
to the "arguably protected" prong of Garmon: When the party
seeking relief in state court has "no right to invoke [the Board's]
jurisdiction" 335 and the party that does have the right to invoke
the Board's jurisdiction fails to do so,s3 6 the preemption doctrine
is inapplicable.
B. Picketing and Violence
State court actions to enjoin picketing or to recover dam-
ages generally are preempted331 unless the picketing involves vi-
olence, intimidation, or similar misconduct.23 8 In permitting
state regulation of labor activity containing elements of violence
or threats of violence, the Supreme Court has found that "state-
court actions to redress injuries caused by. . . [this type of mis-
conduct] are consistent with effective administration of the fed-
eral scheme. 339 For example, a state court may enjoin picketing
that results in traffic congestion and threats of violence as an
exercise of its powers to maintain peace in the community.3 ' 0 In
the corporate campaign context, the target employer involved in
a corporate campaign could use this case law to curb union dem-
onstrations outside a shareholder meeting.
334. See id. at 202.
335. Id. at 207.
336. See 2 LABOR LAW, supra note 43, at 1528.
337. See Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); 2 LABOR
LAW, supra note 43, at 1530 (discussing fact that right to picket is a basic protected
activity under § 7).
338. See International Union, Auto. Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958);
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Con-
str. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); see also A. THIEBLOT & T. HAGGARD, supra note 65, at
225-44.
339. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1977).
340. See General Elec. Co. v. Local 182 Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 47 N.C. App.
153, 266 S.E.2d 750 (1980); see also Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. McCarthy,
708 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); Adolph Coors Co. v. Sickler, 608
F. Supp. 1417 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Mississippi Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Brown & Root, 417 So. 2d 564 (Miss. 1982) (trial court had jurisdiction to issue an in-
junction regulating union picketing where picketers' conduct threatened the public or-
der); PTA Sales, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 462, 96 N.M. 581, 633 P.2d 689 (1981) (trial
court properly enjoined union picketing when union conduct was marked by violence).
See United Auto. Workers, 356 U.S. 634; United Constr. Workers, 347 U.S. 656.
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C. Tortious Interference with Business Relations
Isolation of the target employer from business associates is
often a primary focus of a corporate organizing campaign. Al-
though state claims for tortious interference with business rela-
tions generally are preempted, 41 there is some indication that
courts no longer are automatically rejecting these suits. In 1983
the Washington Supreme Court addressed a claim for tortious
business interference caused by the publication of "Don't Pa-
tronize" articles in a union newspaper. The court did not discuss
whether this cause of action was preempted. Instead, it found
that the articles were constitutionally protected under the first
amendment to the United States Constitution and could not
give rise to liability for tortious interference.3 42 The Ninth Cir-
cuit went even further in Rainbow Tours, Inc. v. Hawaii Joint
Council of Teamsters.4 It found that an employer could re-
cover for business losses caused by illegal mass picketing if that
picketing coerced or intimidated the employer's employees from
crossing the picket line.
34 4
D. Trespass
A favorite corporate campaign tactic is to invade stock-
holder meetings in order to air alleged grievances. When picket-
ing and other concerted activities occur on private property,
state courts often are empowered to adjudicate any controversy
arising from that conduct. Any state decision, however, must ac-
341. See In re Sewell, 690 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1982); Palm Beach Co. v. Journeymen's
& Prod. Allied Serv. Union Local 157, 519 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Stanton v.
Texaco, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2731 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n v.
Certainteed Corp., 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2363 (M.D. Ga. 1981); Pike v. Dan River, Inc.,
112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2452 (S.C. Ct. Common Pleas 1982); Oil Workers Local 1-1978 v.
Standard Oil Co., 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2108 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
342. See Caruso v. Local Union No. 690, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 33 Wash. App.
201, 653 P.2d 638, rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 100 Wash. 2d 343, 670 P.2d
240 (1983).
343. 704 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1983).
344. See id. at 1447-48; see also Pantex Towing Corp. v. Glidewell, 763 F.2d 1241
(11th Cir. 1985); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Seay, 696 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1983);
cf. Local P-9 v. Wynn, No. 86-1259 (D.D.C. May 6, 1986) (complaint filed by local union
against international alleging campaign to undermine local) (discussed in Dally Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 88, at A-9 (May 7, 1986)).
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commodate section 7 rights as well as private property rights.s4"
If the reviewing state court finds the activity to be unprotected,
it may apply its local trespass laws.3"
E. Defamation
In generating the adverse publicity about a target employer
that often is crucial to the success of a corporate organizing cam-
paign, a union may be found liable for defamation. In Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114 11 the plaintiff, an as-
sistant manager of the employer, sued a union for distributing
allegedly defamatory leaflets during an organizing campaign.
The Court found that the NLRA did not preempt the state
court from awarding the damages sought under state law. None-
theless, the Court noted that in order to recover, the plaintiff
had to plead and prove that the allegedly defamatory statements
were made with malice and that he suffered actual injury.34 s
Several state courts have allowed actions to proceed under the
"malicious libel" test of Linn.3 " Other courts have found such
conduct defamatory per se.s5 °
345. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council, 436 U.S. 180,
204-07 (1978).
346. See Brown Jug, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 959, 688 P.2d 932
(Alaska 1984); Bertuccio v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d 363, 173 Cal. Rptr. 411
(1981); Smitty's Super Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Store Employees Local 322, 637 S.W.2d 148
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); John Price Assocs. v. Utah State Conference, 615 P.2d 1210 (Utah
1980).
347. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
348. The Court held:
In order that the recognition of legitimate state interests does not interfere
with effective administration of national labor policy ... [we] therefore limit
the availability of state remedies for libel to those instances in which the com-
plainant can show that the defamatory statements were circulated with malice
and caused him damage.
The standards enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan . . . are
adopted by analogy, rather than under constitutional compulsion. We apply
the malice test to effectuate the statutory design with respect to pre-emption.
Id. at 64-65. See also Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)
(Court reaffirmed Linn rule in that defamation under the nation's labor laws would be
viewed in essentially same manner as defamation under first amendment).
349. See, e.g., Capital Parcel Delivery Co. v. Teamsters, Local 150, 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3351 (E.D. Cal. 1980); Thomas v. Flavin, 58 A.D.2d 1031, 397 N.Y.S.2d 286
(1977).
350. Cf. Barss v. Tosches, 785 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1986); Davis Co. v. United Furniture
Workers, 674 F.2d 557 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 968 (1982); Aarco, Inc. v. Baynes,
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VII. CONCLUSION
The "limited nuclear weapon" 351 that is the corporate cam-
paign may be even more limited than unions anticipate. Even if
conducted legally, the success of such a campaign depends in
large part on the target employer and how it responds to union
pressure. Further, the target employer has a wealth of remedies
at its disposal and the opportunity to apply these remedies in a
new context. A target employer faced with a corporate organiz-
ing campaign need not capitulate to the union's demands.
Through careful analysis and use of established case law, the
target employer has the leverage required to combat the cam-
paign successfully. Unfair labor practice charges, as well as fed-
eral and state claims, can make a corporate organizing campaign
a liability that the union will be eager to forget.
Elizabeth Leigh Mullikin
391 Mass. 560, 462 N.E.2d 1107 (1984); Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, 6 Ohio St.
3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983); Cushman v. Edgar, 44 Or. App. 297, 605 P.2d 1210 (1980).
351. See Remarks of Alfred DeMaria, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at C-1, C-2
(Feb. 13, 1985).
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